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 3 
  The future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was up in the air at the end 
of the Cold War. As an alliance formed to provide collective defense against the Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw Pact, NATO needed to define a new mission in order to continue as a 
meaningful actor in international politics. The prerogatives of the United States, as the main 
military muscle behind NATO, were particularly crucial. Yet there was uncertainty as to whether 
the U.S. would continue to guarantee security even to existing alliance members, let alone 
whether NATO would provide a security umbrella to new members.1  
 Nearly two decades later, by 2008, NATO had grown by ten members. NATO enlarged 
to include three new members in 1997, and again in 2002 to include seven more. Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty now bounds the United States to come to the defense of former Warsaw 
Pact and former Soviet republics. The scope of NATO-protected territory has approached 
Russian borders. Not a bystander to this process, the U.S. has rather led the charge to enlarge 
from within NATO. The major question of this study, then, is why the U.S. extended security 
guarantees to new members and consistently pushed for NATO enlargement under the last three 
presidential administrations. To answer the question, I will test three types of theoretical 
perspectives – international relations, U.S. strategy, and republican security theory – against my 
own empirical history of U.S. policy on NATO enlargement. I will compare the enlargement 
predictions offered by these different perspectives with the motivations of U.S. policymakers. 
The paper starts with a discussion of the different theoretical perspectives I will use, and 
their predictions for enlargement. Theories in international relations aim to describe the general 
behavior of all states. The constructivist perspective in particular offers guidance on enlargement 
policy, and will be the only IR theory that is sufficiently consistent with the broad outlines of the 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, John Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War,” The Atlantic 
Monthly, Vol. 266, No. 2 (August 1990), pp 35-50. 
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history to merit closer analysis in the empirical section. Competing perspectives on U.S. strategy 
aim to describe the specific foreign policy behavior of the United States, using detailed 
examinations of domestic coalitions. From this camp, the cooperative security perspective and 
the primacy perspective each predict NATO enlargement, and thus are explored within my own 
account of enlargement. Finally, the republican-security perspective aims to describe the security 
behavior of republican governments. I will argue that this last perspective offers the best 
explanation for U.S. support for NATO enlargement.  
 Following the theoretical discussion, I turn to my own account of the U.S. push for 
NATO enlargement. I detail how the theoretical concepts of republican security theory fit in with 
the empirical history of enlargement. I argue that policymaker statements used republican 
security concepts in justifying enlargement, and that U.S. policies strived to achieve objectives 
central to republican security theory.  In detailing the history of NATO enlargement from an 
American perspective, I show how these patterns have spanned three Presidents since the Cold 
War, and answer why there has been continuous support for NATO enlargement from three, in 
many ways very different, administrations.  
 The next section introduces the theoretical perspectives I will use in my examination of 
U.S. support for NATO enlargement.    
 
 
I. Theoretical Perspectives 
 
International Relations 
 
The major theories of international relations are used to explain and predict the general 
behavior of states in the international system, including behavior regarding interstate alliances. 
 5 
Here I will briefly outline three dominant theories – neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and 
constructivism – and what each theory predicts about U.S. support for NATO enlargement.  
Neorealism posits a system of competitive states in anarchy, where each state seeks to 
survive and grow its relative power. The structural condition of anarchy acts as the largest 
constraint on state behavior, demanding a self-preservation policy.2 For these reasons, neorealists 
expect cooperation between states to be very rare and very hard to achieve. Competition for 
relative power gains crowds out cooperation. Alliances will only form when an external, third 
party threat outweighs the risks of cooperation, which include worries about relative gains, lack 
of autonomy and lack of trust.3  
 The downfall of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact looked like the end of NATO to 
many neorealists.4 The lack of a major threat meant either the dissolution of NATO or, at best, 
maintenance of the status quo in terms of membership. Considering the high relative gains that a 
country like Poland or Estonia receives when NATO guarantees its security, and the possibility 
that enlargement could mean more confrontation with Russia without offsetting benefits, realists 
would have a hard time arguing that their theory offers the most explanatory perspective on the 
U.S. preference for NATO enlargement. Though I will rule out neorealism as an adequate theory 
for explaining the policy, and do not test its main theoretical concepts later in my take on the 
history of enlargement, there is one specific realist response that deserves attention.  That realist 
argument sees NATO enlargement as a means towards power gains relative to Russia, expanding 
                                                 
2
 See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1979) 
3
 For a realist take on alliances, see John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International 
Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49. 
4
 Lars Skalnes, “From the Outside In, From the Inside Out: NATO Expansion and International 
Relations Theory,” Security Studies, 7, no. 4 (Summer 1998), 61. Also Mearsheimer, “Miss the 
Cold War” (1990). 
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NATO from Western Europe all the way up to Russian borders in an attempt to take over the old 
Soviet “sphere of influence.” I will later argue that this take on NATO enlargement does not 
adequately account for all of the other security motivations driving U.S. support.  
Multiple studies that have pointed out neorealism’s difficulties in accounting for NATO 
enlargement also provide a more hopeful, but ultimately unsatisfying answer on whether a 
neoliberal institutionalist perspective helps explain U.S. policy to expand NATO.5 Though 
neoliberal institutionalism is certainly not contradicted by NATO’s persistence and enlargement, 
these studies show it does little in offering a specific answer for why it happened. 
Neoliberal institutionalism focuses on the “complex interdependence” and potential for 
cooperation among states, as a response to the dire forecast of neorealists.6 According to this 
theory, states worry more about maximizing their absolute gains rather than relative gains, and 
thus see more potential that realists would predict for international cooperation via institutions. 
Rather than the realist focus on balance of power, neoliberals argue states hold a “balance of 
interests” without a specific hierarchy. When states share areas of common interest, neoliberal 
institutionalists expect states to compromise and cooperate through institutions, in order to reap 
gains that would be unavailable without cooperation.  
In his discussion of neoliberal institutionalism’s views on relations after the Cold War, 
Robert Keohane argues that the theory would expect “NATO to use its organizational resources 
                                                 
5
 See Skalnes (1998), Frank Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist 
Explanation, Security Studies, 8, no. 2-3 (Winter 1998), pp. 198-234, and Gunter Hellmann and 
Reinhard Wolf, “Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO,” Security 
Studies, 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1993), pp. 3-43.  
6
 For example, see Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1984). 
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to persist, by changing its tasks.”7 There is no reason why the defeat of the Soviet Union would 
prevent Western institutions from continuing to provide states with opportunities for mutual 
absolute gains.8  NATO’s persistence, as well as its enlargement, does not contradict the theory 
to any degree. But as a systemic theory of international relations, neoliberal institutionalism does 
not seek to describe any particular conception of state interests. Without a prediction of these 
interests, there can be no real explanation for their evolution, and thus while NATO’s 
continuation fits with neoliberal institutionalism the theory can only predict so much: NATO will 
continue if its members continue to share undetermined common interests.9  
As for NATO enlargement specifically, the problem of undefined state interests is still an 
obstacle. And while the theory justifies U.S. belief that an institution such as NATO could affect 
non-members’ interests in a way to qualify them for later membership, the emphasis on 
economic-interdependence and sunk costs as the major reasons for institutional continuity 
certainly seems to weaken neoliberalism’s explanatory power for why the U.S. would advocate 
integrating a small country into NATO, for what is likely to be a higher economic cost.10  
The theory is not of significant use in answering the puzzle of this study. As my 
empirical history of NATO enlargement policy later shows, I believe there was a fundamental 
and consistent interest driving U.S. policymakers on this issue that can be explained using a 
different theoretical perspective, and therefore I rule out neoliberal institutionalism as a possible 
explanation.  
                                                 
7
 Robert Keohane, “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War,” 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism The Contemporary Debate, ed. David Baldwin (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993), 287. 
8
 Keohane (1993), “After the Cold War,” 273.  
9
 Ibid., 287. 
10
 Skalnes (1998), 69. 
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The constructivist perspective on international relations views state behavior and 
interactions through the lens of subjective identities. The focus on structural forces of anarchy, so 
prominent in neorealism, is flipped on its head by the constructivist view that “anarchy is what 
states make of it.”11 The focus for constructivism is on shared values and identities, not anarchy 
or material interests. States do not have simply “a national interest”, but rather a variety of 
relations and interests with other states that come about through social interaction, constructed by 
the actors themselves – “states act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends 
because enemies are threatening and friends are not.”12 From this perspective, socially 
constructed interests give significance to the anarchical relations between states and distribution 
of power among them, not the other way around as in the realist formulation. 
 For constructivists, institutions represent relatively stable sets of identities and interests.13 
Even when they are formalized by rules, institutions still ultimately represent a cognitive 
“collective knowledge,” such that when institutions persist constructivists expect the 
fundamental reason to be because of shared common values. Importantly, this shared value need 
not be cooperative – mutual recognition that two states are “enemies” represents a shared social 
identity, and can form a “self-help” or “competitive” institutional relationship.14 State 
relationships, most importantly for this study, can also be “cooperative,” in which states identify 
positively with one another so that the security of each is perceived, to a certain degree, as the 
responsibility of the entire collective. Depending on how well developed these collective and 
                                                 
11
 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics,” International Organization, 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp 391-425. 
12
 Wendt (1992), 397.  
13
 Ibid., 399.  
14
 Ibid., 399-400. 
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cooperative identities are, security institutions can range from the limited joint action all the way 
to the “full blown form seen in ‘cooperative security’ arrangements.”15 
The constructivist focus on shared meanings makes collective action through institutions 
less dependent on the presence of active threats, and also helps restructure conceptions of state 
objectives in terms of shared norms rather than relative power.16 The constructivist answer on 
whether NATO would continue at all after the disappearance of the Soviet threat is essentially 
the same as the neoliberal answer: perhaps it won’t, but certainly it will if allies “have reasons 
independent of that threat for identifying their security with one another.”17 But through its 
insistence on identities independent of power gains, constructivism offers a more specific answer 
than previous theories: NATO continued after the Cold War because of the allies’ shared values 
of democracy, markets, and liberal principles of sovereignty.  
NATO enlargement specifically can be viewed as an attempt to further the 
institutionalization of these shared meanings to so-called “bad apples,” states that do not share 
them yet – a social process that constructivism accounts for far more effectively than either 
previous IR theory.18 The multitude of values-based argument for enlargement that U.S. 
policymakers offered confirms this perspective as a viable one.19 For these reasons, 
constructivism appears highly consistent with U.S. policy to expand NATO after the Cold War, 
and it receives a more detailed testing in the empirical history of enlargement later on.  
Constructivism predicts that a state is granted NATO membership “if it reliably shares 
the liberal values and multilateralist norms of the Western community…[and if] the faster it 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., 400-401. 
16
 Ibid., 401. 
17
 Ibid., 408. 
18
 Ibid., 409. 
19
 Schimmelfennig (1998), 223-225. 
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internalizes these values and norms, the earlier it becomes a member.”20 Later I conclude that 
although constructivism is highly useful, this prediction does not offer a theoretically satisfying 
explanation for why the U.S. chose the specific states it did through each round of enlargement, 
and why others were left out.  
 
Competing U.S. Strategies  
 
An alternative method for explaining U.S. policy on NATO enlargement is to focus in 
specifically on perspectives on American grand strategy. These perspectives focus more on 
competing foreign policy coalitions in the domestic debate, in contrast to the IR theory 
explanations of state behavior that treat states as unitary actors. The competing strategy 
perspectives that I use here are based on Barry Posen and Andrew Ross’ influential 1996 article 
“Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy.”21 The authors posit four different major security 
strategies that are present in the American public debate after the Cold War. They do so by 
summarizing strategies’ respective views on the main purpose of U.S. security policy, the 
fragility and tractability of the international environment, the preferred policy means, and a host 
of relevant, specific policy questions.22  
The first strategy, neo-isolationism, has the narrowest view of American interests abroad. 
With the end of the Cold War this strategy argues for a pullback of American international 
activity. It argues that “the United States is not responsible for, and cannot afford the costs of, 
maintaining world order;” the very attempts at such a mission endanger our security at home.23 
                                                 
20
 Ibid., 216. 
21
 Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” 
International Security, 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 5-53. 
22
 Posen and Ross (96/97), 7-9.  
23
 Ibid., 13. 
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Terrorist attacks and great power conflicts would not occur if the U.S. did not meddle militarily 
abroad. Most importantly for this study, neo-isolationism calls for an abandonment of the NATO 
alliance, not its enlargement.24 The isolationist perspective is clearly inconsistent with historical 
developments and thus need not be considered further. 
 Selective engagement focuses on what its advocates see as the greatest threat to 
American security: a war between big, industrial countries. Because the U.S. has historically 
found it necessary to involve itself in great power wars, and because these conflicts are presumed 
to be the most likely scenario of large-scale uses of force, U.S. security policy must center its 
attention on balancing powerful nations such that major conflicts never break out. Interstate 
conflicts, and explicitly not intrastate or ethnic conflicts, are the vital sources of insecurity that 
America need attend to. Interventions that are not in the interest of preventing great power wars 
only use up precious domestic political capital that may later be lacking when a true conflict 
needs attention. This entails a regional focus, specifically on Europe, East Asia, and the Middle 
East – areas that include great powers and/or contain specific regional characteristics that could 
serve to spark a great power war, as with oil in the Middle East. Finally, advocates of selective 
engagement advocates favor the Cold War status quo in NATO policy. NATO should continue 
to act as a collective defense alliance for its current members, ensuring stability only in that 
region. All NATO enlargement would serve to do, from this perspective, is exacerbate tensions 
with Russia and China.25 Once again, I rule out selective engagement here and do not test it 
further in my empirical examination.  
                                                 
24
 Ibid., 12-14.  
25
 Ibid., 20-22. 
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 Cooperative security argues for the broadest conception of American national security 
interests, and entails the biggest mission in terms of scope and resources.26 This strategy expands 
selective engagement’s focus on interstate conflicts to include intrastate conflicts as well. The 
position of the United States according to these advocates is one of high “strategic 
interdependence”: wars in one place are likely to spread, the use of WMD will beget more use, 
ethnic cleansing will beget more ethnic cleansing. In other words, it is in the direct interest of the 
U.S. to root out numerous large and small conflicts that, if left to simmer, would draw American 
military intervention at a later and more volatile time.27 Because a variety of conflicts threaten 
American security, U.S. cooperative security policy should focus on strengthening regional and 
global international institutions to both directly counter violent conflicts and to deter future ones. 
International institutions are preferred because their geographic scope and multi-national military 
capability offer the greatest chance of a credible deterrent to conflict. Additionally, military 
action by international institutions inevitably has more legitimacy – and thus will cause less 
global backlash – than unilateral or ad-hoc coalition military action.  
A deep patchwork of global and regional international institutions, for cooperative 
security advocates, would serve to foster cooperation in a variety of policy sectors where 
democracies can reap mutual gains – “diplomatic, economic, and security arrangements” all have 
a place.28 The ultimate goal is the creation of an international system that integrates Russia, 
China, and other potential great power rivals, and therefore these institutions should not seek to 
create new tensions either. For these reasons, the cooperative security strategy calls for an 
enlarged and transformed (as in, Russia-friendly) NATO, to act as a major regional security 
                                                 
26
 Ibid., 23. 
27
 Ibid., 25. 
28
 Ibid., 27. 
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institution promoting stability across the entire European continent as means towards 
integration.29  
Cooperative security is broadly consistent with a policy of enlarging NATO, and so I 
discuss it later in my empirical history of enlargement. There, I show commonly cited advocates 
of cooperative security were found to argue both for and against NATO enlargement, and 
conclude that the perspective offers too broad a set of policy objectives to be the most 
explanatory of NATO enlargement.  
 The final strategy, primacy, rests on the principle that a preponderance of U.S. power 
internationally is the only path to eventual world peace.30 While primacy advocates agree with 
selective engagement that great power wars are the biggest threat, they prefer to avoid this 
possibility through the continued build-up of American military and economic power, not 
through the selective balancing of powerful states. Present and future great powers, primacy 
suggests, will be deterred from posing threats to the U.S. because the cost would be existentially 
high, and other actors will welcome this particular form “benign hegemony” for its stability and 
predictability. While committed to liberal principles like cooperative security, the primacy 
strategy is more judicious with U.S. commitments because national autonomy of action needs to 
always be maintained. International institutions can be useful if they promote a system of 
international law, democracy, and markets that entrenches the current unipolar structure of global 
power, or even “if the façade of multilateralism renders the rule of an extraordinary power more 
palatable to ordinary powers.”31  
                                                 
29
 Ibid., 24, 27.  
30
 Ibid., 32. 
31
 Ibid., 34. 
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The primacy strategy is highly consistent with the evidence of a U.S. push for NATO’s 
post-Cold War relevancy, so as to preclude developments that may “undermine the role of 
NATO, and therefore the role of the United States, in European security affairs.”32 Viewing 
NATO enlargement as a hedge against Russian aggression, and a method of integrating Central 
and Eastern European states into the security wing of Western institutions, the primacy 
perspective appears broadly consistent with the history, and merits greater attention later in the 
empirical section. There I will argue that, although consistent, primacy does not offer a sufficient 
explanation for the process of NATO enlargement, either its speed or its particular progression.  
Both cooperative security and primacy are each individually helpful in explaining NATO 
enlargement policy, but for different administrations. A theoretical explanation that accounts for 
the continuity of NATO enlargement policy throughout different presidencies, then, would seem 
to have more explanatory power than either of these two competing strategy perspectives.  
 
Republican Security Theory 
The final perspective I will test is the republican security theory perspective, from Daniel 
Deudney’s book Bounding Power.33 Deudney’s work shows how theorists in republican polities 
–  based on political liberty, popular sovereignty, and limited government constitutionalism – 
have reacted to changing material contexts in the international system throughout history.34 In 
clarifying the most important “problematiques” and solutions offered in this wide-ranging 
historical debate, Deudney constructs a coherent “republican security theory” that attempts to 
grapple with the basic and ever-present question of what “political arrangements are necessary 
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 Ibid., 34. 
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 Daniel Deudney, Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory From the Polis to the Global 
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34
 Deudney (2007), 2.  
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for security.”35 Here I will discuss the central theoretical concepts of republican security theory: 
violence interdependence, anarchy-interdependence, hierarchy-restraint, and cobinding through 
interstate union. I will also touch on Deudney’s account of how these concepts relate to the 
history of American security policy generally conceived.  
Republican security theory posits only two possible restraints on the use of violence, or 
solutions to insecurity: limits imposed by material contexts, both geographical and technological, 
or limits imposed by socially constructed political structures.36 A key republican security insight 
is that these two limits on insecurity are “interactive”: limitations imposed by material contexts 
change over time, which in turn alters the kinds of political structures necessary to confront 
insecurity that material limitations can no longer control.37 The oceans did not need governance 
before technology made navies possible, just as nuclear arms control regimes were not necessary 
until the creation of nuclear weapons. Historically, as new forms of destruction, transportation 
and communication emerge, so too has the necessity for new types of political restraints.  
Republican security theorists have focused most on one material variable, which 
Deudney labels violence interdependence, simply his term for the basic capacity of actors to 
commit violence upon one another.38 Measuring the degree of capabilities among actors based 
only on empirical evaluations of geography and technology, violence interdependence has 
“profound implications for security that are independent of the distribution (or balance) of 
power” among the actors themselves.39 Looking back through history, the major implication for 
security arises from the fact that violence interdependence has grown across both space and time, 
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 Ibid., 27. 
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 Ibid., 27. 
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 Ibid., 27-28. 
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 Ibid., 18. 
39
 Ibid., 35. 
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driven primarily by technological change.40 Because material and social-political restraints are 
interactive, republican security theorists hold that these vast changes in violence interdependence 
– from bows and arrows to nuclear weapons – have demanded the need for new and bigger forms 
of political arrangements. 
When a new generation of technology causes a shift in degree of violence 
interdependence, a transformation occurs from “second anarchy,” where the levels of violence 
are essentially tolerable, to “first anarchy,” where material changes in technology render the 
existing forms of political authority insufficient for human survival.41 For example before the 
Industrial Revolution, the European state system was competitive but in second anarchy. It was 
only with the new capabilities of violence at the turn of the century that anarchy proved 
intolerable – and unsurprisingly what followed were major world wars and attempts at creating 
larger forms of political structures, first through domination than through institution building.42 
This major claim about the relationship between anarchy and violence interdependence – “that 
actors in first anarchies require substantive government for security, while actors in second 
anarchies do not” – is one of the two pillars of republican security theory: the anarchy-
interdependence problematique.43 
While republican security theorists advocated the need for larger scales of governance to 
match larger scales of violence, they also forwarded a core insight about the quality of new 
governance: a hierarchical new government can be just as potent a source of insecurity as the 
state of first anarchy it was meant to mitigate, because a centralization of unchecked power does 
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not provide “adequate restraint upon the application of violence to human bodies.”44 This major 
claim about the similarity between anarchy and hierarchy – that both are intolerable to security 
when unrestrained by material or political constraints – is the second pillar of republican security 
theory: the hierarchy-restraint problematique.45  
The anarchy-interdependence and hierarchy-restraint concepts essentially posit two 
primary interests for theorists of republican security – survival, and the republican characteristics 
of political liberty, popular sovereignty, and limited government. While these republican features 
may have inherent moral value, it is important to note that republican security theorists were 
most concerned with the practical, security-based value in these constraints on government. So 
while these theorists see the need to extend the scope of government in order to mitigate anarchy, 
they also insist on constraining that new power in order to avoid hierarchical arrangements and 
illiberal concentrations of power. As Deudney puts it, republican security calls for negarchy, in 
which anarchy and hierarchy are both negated through actors “authoritatively ordered by 
relations of mutual restraint,” not by subordination or lack of authority.46 These mutual restraints 
are republican in nature, and so the concept of negarchy is simply Deudney’s way of arguing that 
republicanism has historically been a security arrangement, in addition to being a manifestation 
of normative liberal values. The dual aversion to anarchy and hierarchy is what makes the set of 
foreign policy concerns and practices “distinctive to republics.”47   
Theorists in republics throughout history have advocated a particular strategy of 
negarchy, cobinding, in which republics join together with other republics in various forms of 
                                                 
44
 Ibid., 31. 
45
 Ibid., 29. 
46
 Ibid., 48. 
47
 Ibid., 55. 
 18 
union.48 Specifically, cobinding occurs through interstate unions that “entail the delegation of 
specified authorities to international organs.”49  
Republics have both strong incentives and strong capabilities to cobind for the sake of 
security. The stronger incentives come from the republican sensitivity to hierarchical tendencies 
in responding to first anarchy, a sensitivity that interstate unions alleviate because they “make 
less necessary the centralization of authority, and thus less likely the deformation of domestic 
republican forms.”50 If Republic A is highly violence-interdependent with Republic B, for 
instance, both states will have a better chance of maintaining their domestic republican character 
if they opt to share and restrain their combined power in an international institution – as an 
expression of each state’s sovereignty, but also as a limitation on their autonomy internationally.  
Cobinding is preferable to attempts at isolation or domination, both of which serve to 
reinforce domestic hierarchy and potentially produce intolerable insecurity. Luckily republics 
also have the greatest ability to cobind, because “the structure of such unions extends their 
fundamental constitutional arrangements.”51 In other words a mutual fear of anarchy and 
hierarchy is more likely to result in a mutual cooperation characterized by neither. For 
contemporary international politics and republican security theory, common examples of 
interstate unions are international arms control regimes or collective defense organizations.52 
Now that the major theoretical components of republican security theory have been laid 
out, it is important to highlight how they relate to the history of American security policy. 
Deudney argues that the American founding itself was a republican alternative to the European 
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system of hierarchical units operating in anarchy. As a decentralized federation of states, the 
American system gave its members the size and security viability previously only available to 
hierarchies, but within a distinctly republican form.53 The industrial and nuclear revolutions 
catapulted violence interdependence to a continental and then global level, ensuring that 
republican security theorists continued to inform foreign policy debates and the behavior of 
republican governments during that time.54 For example, advocates of republican security theory 
during the industrial revolution, most prominently H.G. Wells, predicted that material-contextual 
changes and growing violence interdependence would force a union of Western liberal 
democracies, particularly between a European Union and America.55  
Most importantly for this study, republican security theory heavily informed American 
policymakers during the 20th century. During the last century, a consensus in American security 
policy emerged that started from the anarchy-interdependence rationale as it applied to Europe. 
American security policy since World War I has, argues Deudney, assumed that “rising levels of 
interdependence, especially of violence, produced by the industrial and nuclear revolutions have 
made isolationism impossible and internationalism necessary for the survival of limited 
government.”56 The heavy pivot in U.S. security policy towards “making the world safe for 
democracy,” started by Woodrow Wilson, was aimed at both aggregating power between 
republics in order to respond to external anarchy, and trying to influence states in the 
international system into becoming republics.57 Alliances with other republics and the addition of 
new republics avoided the need to bunker up into a garrison state or attempt to secure European 
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sources of insecurity by unilateral force. Both strategies of isolation and domination would result 
in the corruption of the U.S. republican character for the sake of security.58  
The level of violence interdependence with Europe over the past century, from a U.S. 
perspective, has necessitated “cobinding for the survival of the U.S. constitution.” This was the 
core logic informing a variety of cooperative U.S. policies with European republics during the 
20th century, resulting in a large web of interstate unions in many policy areas.59  As the 
dominant military power in the NATO alliance, the U.S. has played a crucial role in European 
unification for the sake of both U.S. homeland security and the security of European republics.60 
Thus, the formation of NATO and its activity during the Cold War was heavily informed by 
republican security, as it represents part of a union between Western liberal democracies under 
American auspices that “clearly sits along the main axis of republican security theory.”61 In the 
table below, I summarize the relevant republican security concepts and how they have generally 
appeared in U.S. foreign policy: 
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Table 1. Republican Security Theory Concepts 
Violence interdependence: the capacity of actors to commit violence upon one another, determined by new spatial and 
destructive material capabilities  
 
Anarchy-interdependence: ungoverned spaces of anarchy require new forms of government when a worse degree of 
violence interdependence is introduced 
 
Hierarchy-restraint: insecurity can arise from centralization of power, just as much as from anarchy 
 
Cobinding: interstate unions in which republics consolidate governing authority in an institution, but decentralize it 
through the application of mutual constraints 
 
Republican Security Theory Concepts in U.S. Foreign Policy: 
• Anarchy-Interdependence: Decrease the instances of out of control violence and conflict because it is 
necessary in a world of high violence interdependence  
• Hierarchy-Restraint: Prevent the U.S. from becoming isolationist garrison state 
• Hierarchy-Restraint: Prevent the U.S. from becoming hegemonic state 
• Cobinding: Alliances with other republics  
o eg, NATO 
o requires protecting and encouraging republican governments internationally 
 
It is important to note that republican security theory is a set of functionality, rather than 
functionalist, arguments. It is made up of claims about which arrangements are best in meeting 
some goal or purpose, rather than claiming that outcomes emerge because they met some goal or 
purpose. The arguments of republican thinkers like Wells – providing the theoretical precursor to 
American internationalism generally conceived – did “not maintain that a European and then a 
global consolidation will happen, but that it must happen to achieve security.”62  
It is my claim then that U.S. officials who crafted NATO enlargement policy were in 
essence acting as republican-security theorists, like the functionality thinkers Deudney focuses 
on in his writing. Of course it makes sense that policymakers would think in functionality terms, 
but I am claiming that the consistent pattern in U.S. enlargement thinking over eighteen years – 
that three administration’s worth of policymakers used the same republican-security rationales 
and methods when it came to NATO enlargement – actually makes republican-security theory an 
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effective explanation of U.S. support of NATO enlargement. By showing that the enlargement 
policy emerged as a republican security initiative in practice, in other words, I will use 
republican security theoretical concepts to offer theory-based justifications for why the U.S. 
pursued the policy that it did. In the next section, I outline the general contours of republican 
security theory’s relationship to NATO enlargement, and offer my empirical history of NATO 
enlargement as evidence of that relationship.  
 
 
II. The Republican Security Logic of NATO Enlargement 
 
The Argument 
 
 My basic argument is that NATO enlargement, an American initiative, followed the 
republican security agenda of American internationalism. It sought “to populate the international 
system with republics and to abridge international anarchy” in Europe.63 As Deudney writes, this 
agenda measures success “by the extent to which the United States is situated in a nonanarchical 
international system populated by republican states.”64 Therefore U.S. policies that seek (a) to 
expand the space in which the U.S. does not have to respond to major levels of violence, (b) to 
increase the number of republican governments internationally, or (c) to contain violent conflict 
in areas of weak governance, all aim to achieve republican security objectives. 
The empirical section of this paper intends to show how these three general objectives are 
embedded into the U.S. effort to enlarge NATO. The empirical section is a chronological history, 
but republican security concepts appear and reappear over time. What follows is a broad 
                                                 
63
 Deudney, (2007), 186. 
64
 Ibid., 187. 
 23 
discussion of the ways in which republican security concepts occur throughout the history of 
NATO enlargement. 
First, general republican security concepts in U.S. foreign policy (see Table 1) are shown 
in a variety of quotations and arguments made by government officials in the two Bush and 
Clinton administrations. I cite instances of the three Presidents and top policymakers outlining a 
particular view of U.S. violence interdependence, as it existed after the Cold War. These remarks 
focus mostly on the possibility of ethnic and nationalist violence in the now autonomous area of 
former Soviet states, spilling over into Western Europe or escalating to an intolerable level of 
destruction requiring a large-scale American response, as well as material analyses of weapons 
and capabilities of destruction. In referencing this new source of violence interdependence, U.S. 
policymakers are seen arguing that U.S. security would be better off if these new dangerous 
areas of insecurity were mitigated or contained. They argue that preventing escalating conflict 
and anarchy in these areas should be paramount in U.S. security policy. These examples 
constitute evidence of the anarchy-interdependence rationale in NATO enlargement policy. The 
hierarchy-restraint rationale appears in the history of NATO enlargement through administration 
arguments about the undesirability of an isolationist or hegemonic foreign policy, in response to 
this new source of anarchy-interdependence.  
 Next, the republican security concept of cobinding through interstate union is shown to 
be central to U.S. policy on NATO after the Cold War. I argue that the U.S., in pushing for the 
maintenance of NATO as the primary security actor in Europe, strengthened an interstate union 
in which it could have influential say over what sources of insecurity most necessitated a 
response, while still benefiting from the advantages of alliance over isolation and unilateralism. 
This can be conceptualized in republican security as a strategy of cobinding that relies on a 
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specifically-American view of violence interdependence, in that the U.S. desired the most say in 
directing security policy in Europe.  
In ensuring that NATO remained relevant in the nineties, U.S. officials also positioned 
NATO as an important vehicle for cooperation with non-NATO members, particularly former 
Soviet states in Eastern Europe and Russia. This is seen initially in the creation of the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) under the first Bush administration, and the Partnership 
for Peace (PfP) and Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) programs launched in the early years of 
Clinton’s first term. Both of these initiatives paved the way for NATO enlargement, acting as an 
intermediate step towards new cobinding relationships with countries that later became NATO 
members. I show how these programs aimed to guide the implementation of republican 
constraints in non-NATO states – specifically civil-military relations and controls over defense 
forces – as well as to add to NATO’s capability responding to acute instabilities outside of 
NATO territories, or “out-of-area.” I claim these policies goals meant to contribute to the general 
republican security objectives of influencing the number of states characterized by republican 
government in the international system, and containing violent conflict in areas of weak 
governance. 
 NATO enlargement itself was hinted at by the first Bush administration, announced and 
implemented by the Clinton administration, and continued by the second Bush administration. I 
show how the prospect of NATO membership was consistently used to increase the incentives 
for republican constraints on new governments within European states (again in defense force 
constraints and civil-military relations), to foster cooperative security practices among aspirant 
members, and to boost the incentives for upgrading military capabilities and interoperability with 
NATO forces. Through this use of membership as a carrot, I argue the prospect of NATO 
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enlargement was meant to help each republican security objective – growing the space in which 
the U.S. would not have to respond to large-scale violence, supporting the installation of new 
republican governments internationally, and building capacity to contain violence in areas of 
weak governance. 
 Finally, I claim the two actual rounds of NATO enlargement were motivated by 
republican security objectives. Granting the collective defense guarantee to a new NATO 
member was meant to protect the advances in democratic governance and military capability 
achieved by that country, as a prerequisite to membership. By using the dual criteria of 
“republican constraints” and “military capability,” each enlargement decision aimed to decrease 
the likelihood that NATO would have to respond to conflicts within the new member state, and 
to increase the capability of NATO to respond quickly and preemptively to conflicts outside of 
the new member state. These twin benefits encapsulate what Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright described as ''the productive paradox at NATO's heart: By extending solemn security 
guarantees, we actually reduce the chance that our troops will again be called to fight in 
Europe.''65 NATO enlargement, I argue, intended to serve all three republican security objectives: 
increase the space in which the U.S. need never respond to a major conflict, increase the number 
of republican government populating the international system, and increase the ability of NATO 
to respond to out-of-area conflicts. This organizational setup is summarized in the table below. 
Following that is the empirical section tracing the history of U.S. policy on NATO enlargement.  
Table 2. Republican Security Theory in NATO Enlargement 
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Republican Security Objectives of NATO Enlargement: 
• Extend the space in which the U.S. does not have to face major, violent conflicts 
• Support and protect the emergence of new republican states internationally 
• Mitigate violent conflicts in areas of weak governance 
 
Evidence: 
• Republican security concepts in U.S. and NATO statements and policies 
• Republican security objectives of NATO enlargement in U.S. and NATO policy 
 
 
Organization of the Enlargement History 
 
Since 1990, NATO has had two complete rounds of enlargement. In 1997, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary were invited to join the alliance. Five years later, in 2002, seven 
more states were invited into NATO – Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, 
and Bulgaria. In both instances, the decisions of American policymakers were the driving force 
behind enlargement, and the following empirical section traces the motivations of these 
policymakers and the choices they made regarding enlargement. Within the section, I hope to 
show how U.S. policymakers were motivated by republican security theory.  
The first Bush administration did not officially enlarge NATO, but made important 
decisions that both paved the way for future enlargement and carried with them heavy republican 
security influences. The push for NATO’s relevancy and primacy in Europe after the Cold War, 
and the establishment of cooperative institutions between NATO and non-NATO members 
focusing most on republican constraints on defense forces, are the two major policy decisions to 
note in this administration. The former ensured the U.S. could most influence responses to acute 
instances of anarchy-interdependence, yet still do so through interstate union rather than 
unilateral force. The latter aimed to enhance the republican character of new states, and help 
contribute to NATO’s ability to respond to out-of-area spaces of anarchy. 
The Clinton administration committed the United States to lead on NATO enlargement, 
and oversaw the first round that admitted three new members in 1997. There are three major 
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Clinton policies that receive attention. First, the setup of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and 
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) in 1994 made the military cooperation between NATO and 
non-NATO members operational, paving the way for enlargement but also, in itself, aiming to 
influence the number of republican states internationally and add to NATO’s capability to 
respond out-of-area. Next, the actual decision to push for NATO enlargement was driven by 
analyses of violence interdependence, and aimed at extending the space in which the U.S. would 
never have to respond to major conflicts. Using NATO membership as a carrot to motivate 
reform in non-republican states was meant to increase the number of republican governments 
internationally. Finally, the decisions on which members to admit into NATO in the first round 
of enlargement are used to show the explanatory power of republican security theory relative to 
the constructivist, realist, and primacy perspectives on enlargement.  
 
Republican Security Theory in George H.W. Bush’s NATO Policy 
During the last decade of the Cold War there was a growing feeling in the United States, 
particularly in the Congress, that too much of the U.S. defense budget was going towards 
maintaining a military presence in Europe, through NATO. As George H.W. Bush entered office, 
there was political pressure to reduce American troop commitments and cajole European allies to 
build up a “European pillar” of NATO. The fall of the Berlin Wall in May 1989 gave even more 
ammunition to the advocates for a reduced troop presence. 66 During the next few years, a debate 
grew among NATO allies over the future relevancy of the alliance in European security. The 
debate focused most on future American leadership, an autonomous Western European defense 
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arm pushed mainly by France and a newly unified Germany67, and other European security 
organizations that included the Soviet Union and former Soviet territories.68 The Bush 
administration pushed for a policy of NATO primacy among European security organizations 
and a continued American leadership role in the alliance, in addition to dropping hints at the 
future possibility of enlargement. Throughout, the administration followed republican security 
logic.  
The summer and fall of 1990, as it became clear that the Warsaw Pact would cease to 
exist in any organized form, was the first period when NATO enlargement seemed like an actual 
possibility. Around this time, officials in Washington began to consider enlargement as a follow-
up to NATO-Warsaw relations that were signaled over the summer.69 Although President Bush 
ruled out official membership in the near-term, he refused to rule it out forever, indicating that it 
was Warsaw state preferences delaying considerations of membership.70  
In analyzing potential security relationships between the U.S. and the increasingly 
unpredictable nature of Warsaw Pact territories, Bush administration officials pushed NATO to 
use the anarchy-interdependence rationale to define new policies.  The NATO summit in London 
in June 1990 resulted in a declaration of principles that justified the new “hand of friendship” 
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offer to Warsaw states with the claim that “in the new Europe, the security of every state is 
inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours.”71 The NATO communiqué released a few 
months later after a meeting of defense ministers, including Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, 
described the new forms of violence interdependence since the Soviet demise as arising 
“principally not from the likelihood of deliberate aggression…but rather as unforeseeable 
consequences of instabilities that might emerge in a period of rapid and widespread political, 
social and economic transformation,” specifically “from instability in East and Central 
Europe.”72  
During this same period, administration officials sought to make sure that Americans did 
not grow too isolationist and wary about committing tax dollars abroad. Yet they also hoped that 
security policies and the use of force in these new anarchic territories would continue to operate 
through the successful republican union of NATO. In this way the hierarchy-restraint rationale 
began to come through, as U.S. officials had to argue against the tendency to fall into only 
“garrison state” defense spending, and simultaneously against the tendency to project U.S. power 
unilaterally – both of which could corrupt American domestic forms in the long-term.  
Right after the Berlin Wall fell Bush administration officials spurned isolationism and 
immediately asserted that the U.S. was going to coordinate its defense posture, including any 
force withdrawals, within NATO and not unilaterally. 73 Speaking with reporters after the 
London summit in June 1990, President Bush pushed back against growing domestic concerns 
over the fiscal cost of internationalism, saying that he felt a “U.S. force presence in Europe is 
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stabilizing and very, very important,” and that he viewed it as his “responsibility to make clear to 
the American taxpayer why it is in our interest to help keep the peace.”74 Months later when the 
Gulf War was showing European allies that they still needed a robust U.S. presence to maintain 
stability, American officials tried to use the example as a way to avoid similar hegemonic 
projections of power in the future. As an American official said at the time, “we keep telling the 
Europeans that we don’t want to act alone…we’d be happy if they did more.”75   
As 1991 started, American officials had established their hierarchy-restraint preference 
for no isolationism and no unilateral hegemony. A NATO ministerial meeting in Copenhagen, 
taking place in June of 1991, was an important step forward for the transformative changes to the 
alliance, pushed by the U.S. the previous summer in London. As European allies agreed to fund a 
rapid-reaction force that could respond to new types of insecurities and spaces of anarchy, U.S. 
officials had to make sure that this force remained under NATO auspices so as to not contribute 
to the alliance’s decline and irrelevance.76 Such a development would box the U.S. out of 
contributing heavily to security stability in and near Europe, and thus was unacceptable from an 
American anarchy-interdependence perspective.  
Accordingly, the NATO communiqué following the June ’91 Ministerial meeting stated 
the need to “enhance the role and responsibility” of European allies; it also pointed out that 
conflict in the Persian Gulf highlighted the need for NATO to develop out-of-area capabilities – 
by showing that “in an interdependent world that is increasingly affected by technological 
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advances” outside conflicts can have “direct security implications.”77 In his remarks at the 
meeting, Secretary of State Jim Baker reiterated that one of America’s “key goals must be to 
ensure that NATO remain the principal venue” for all policy debates involving the security of 
alliance members.78 The genuine effort to push allies to spend more on defense and 
peacekeeping forces within NATO represented a U.S. desire to maintain influence in European 
security arrangements, but to lessen the already-heavy security burden that the U.S. felt during 
the Cold War (an aversion to unilateral hegemonic preponderance). The hierarchy-restraint 
aversion to isolationism and hegemony, because of fears regarding U.S. domestic forms, greatly 
informed this U.S. push for continued NATO relevance. 
The most important development from that June 1991 meeting, as it relates to this study, 
was the stronger cooperative signals NATO sent to Central and Eastern European states. Again 
emphasizing that NATO member “security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in 
Europe,” NATO allies agreed that “the consolidation and preservation throughout the continent 
of democratic societies…are therefore of direct and material concern.”79  This was a clear 
indication that, at least theoretically, the U.S. would support NATO going out-of-area to ensure 
the security of non-members.80 In August of 1991, a Pentagon working group drafted a detailed 
scenario in which the U.S. and its NATO allies would come to the defense of a smaller Baltic 
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country (Lithuania, in this case) and the Polish border, in the face of threat from an “expansionist 
authoritarian government” in Moscow.81 
Central to this initial outreach was, crucially, intensified contacts and “familiarization” 
between NATO and non-NATO military and civilian leaders.82 This suggested that the most 
urgent aspect of consolidating “democratic societies” was making sure that there were republican 
constraints on the use of force in these new countries. This was a practice the Clinton 
administration would embrace full stop with its enlargement policy. It is also a policy fully 
informed by the republican security insight on the insecurity of hierarchical government, and the 
solution of cobinding through republican restraint as the best means of security.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union during the fall of 1991 renewed questions over NATO’s 
future existence, all of which came to a head at a major NATO Summit in Rome attended by 
President Bush himself, in early November 1991. For the first time in twenty-four years, the 
alliance released a “New Strategic Concept” that built upon the signals sent the previous year 
and a half. It was the most comprehensive statement of new violence interdependence that had 
been offered yet by NATO allies. In defending its claim that “the new environment does not 
change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring 
validity,” the document highlighted instabilities in Central and Eastern Europe that “could 
involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security 
of the Alliance,” the dangers of “proliferation of weapons technologies…including weapons of 
mass destruction,” and the continued existence of Soviet nuclear weapons.83 
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With the alliance essentially backing the U.S. notions of violence and anarchy-
interdependence, the Rome Summit also marked the success of Bush’s push for NATO primacy, 
which was informed by an American need to balance violence interdependence with hierarchy-
restraint’s need for cobinding. At the summit, even France and Germany made it clear to the U.S. 
that its role as alliance leader, and the alliance’s primacy in European security, would not be 
challenged.84 
The Rome Summit also formalized the cooperation signaled in Copenhagen, with the 
creation of a council in which former Warsaw and Soviet states could consult with NATO. In a 
way this was related to U.S. support of NATO’s primacy, as it ensured that NATO cooperation 
and future membership was more important and would outpace new memberships into the 
European Union.85 Named the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991, 
the council was most focused on installing republican constraints on domestic militaries. Though 
Bush thought it too soon to offer formal NATO memberships at the Rome Summit, he touted a 
key feature of the liaison program – helping former Warsaw Pact states “change their military 
apparatus from a weapon of the state into a guardian of a free people.”86 In explicitly trying to 
enhance the republican character of these non-NATO members, this new council represented the 
first step in applying a hierarchy-restraint rationale and cobinding strategy as it applied 
specifically to new countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The U.S. was trying to increase the 
number of republican governments, capable of effective interstate unions, throughout Europe. 
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As the Bush administration closed out its final year in office, the creation of the NACC 
had put NATO enlargement squarely on the table. Administration officials took conflicting 
positions, with some thinking it would provide the most stable security environment (Cheney, 
Secretary of State Lawrence Eaglesburg) and others thinking instability in Russia meant 
enlargement now was too soon (Baker, and President Bush).87 U.S. NATO ambassador William 
Taft perhaps summed up the consensus administration position best on July 13, 1992, when he 
said membership offers “could come within the next decade, perhaps soon,” but that the NACC 
itself was not a step towards that membership.88  
By the fall of 1992 and Bill Clinton’s election, the grounds of the debate were shifting: 
NATO would retain its primacy, but now the question was to what extent NATO should 
cooperate with its new expansive partner body, the NACC, and how quickly that cooperation 
should outpace potential NATO memberships with safer, more republican states within the 
council. Though the Bush administration did not enlarge NATO, the alliance’s future role was 
fairly secure and enlargement was a policy question now forced upon the next administration. 
Bush administration arguments for why NATO had to remain relevant and one day expand, and 
why American leadership in the alliance was still necessary, were driven by anarchy-
interdependence and hierarchy-restraint problematiques, and aimed to achieve republican 
interstate unions. 
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Anarchy-Interdependence and Hierarchy-Restraint in the Clinton Administration 
 
Early in the Clinton administration, high-level foreign policy officials confirmed their 
agreement with core republican security insights about U.S. security policy after the Cold War. 
Starting with the President himself, only weeks after entering office Clinton made it clear that 
violence interdependence in Europe was very strong and in need of cobinding. The fear of 
escalating violence was apparent at a February 10th, 1993 town hall meeting in Detroit. 
Answering a question about the conflict in Bosnia, Clinton responded that “we’ve got to try to 
contain” conflicts like this – to avoid ethnic cleansing from becoming a valid principle at the end 
of the Cold War, and because problems “could spread to other republics and nations near 
there.”89 Clinton also mentioned that, because of the high likelihood of spreading conflicts in 
Europe, it was “no accident that World War I started in this area.” In pushing for multilateral 
efforts at peacekeeping, Clinton showed his support for the hierarchy-restraint aversion to 
isolationism and hegemony, saying that while he did “not believe that the military of the United 
States should get involved unilaterally there now,” the U.S. was going to take a “much more 
aggressive position” and in doing so “we have to work with these other countries.”90  
 Secretary of State Warren Christopher also gave explicit support to republican security 
concepts a month into the new administration, in a speech to NATO allies in Brussels on 
February 26, 1993. Christopher’s anarchy-interdependence logic came through in his description 
of the “new dangers” that have arisen since the Berlin Wall fell: “ethnic antagonisms and 
splintering nations” spawning violence, and global threats of “arms proliferation, environmental 
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degradation, and rapid population growth.” 91 All of these new dangers along with lessons from 
the last “turbulent century,” according to Christopher, only further underscored a core truth “that 
our security is indivisible and that our dreams and destiny are linked.” The hierarchy-restraint 
logic of American multilateralism was also evident in Christopher’s claim that, despite the desire 
of some Americans to withdrawal heavily from Europe, “America’s commitment to Europe’s 
security is undiminished and unwavering” and that the best way for that commitment to take 
form was through the “continuing need for NATO as a guarantor of collective defense…by a 
thriving transatlantic partnership.”92 Finally, months later in June 1993, Christopher echoed the 
anarchy-interdependence logic once again, calling the West’s failure to act in the Balkans 
“missed opportunities” and hoping that allies “learn that we must work together earlier to help 
prevent conflicts before they erupt.”93 
 Madeline Albright, future Secretary of State and an advocate of NATO enlargement, 
encapsulated the entire republican security agenda for American internationalism in a speech she 
gave in 1994 as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Albright spoke of the globe as “far 
smaller now” than it was at the start of the century, specifically because of material-contextual 
factors contributing to acute interdependence: “weapons cost less but can destroy more at further 
range. Borders provide little protection…economies are interdependent. Populations…are highly 
mobile. And images of heroism and horror are transmitted instantly and constantly to and from 
every corner of the earth.” 94 In particular the degree of uncertainty and instability in former 
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Soviet territories meant the possibility that “current conflicts spread” and “other regional powers 
could be drawn in.” Albright’s belief in the hierarchy-restraint aversion to American isolationism 
was also clear when she criticized “some in Congress who either would pull the plug altogether” 
and “those who suggest that America’s challenges at home justify turning away from 
responsibilities abroad.” Her aversion to hegemony’s corruption of domestic forms came through 
in her claim that there were no more important issues than whether the U.S. will be “forced to 
fight big wars because we failed to prevent small ones, or “will have to resume a military buildup 
because of setbacks in Moscow or because nuclear weapons have fallen into the wrong hands.”95 
 Finally, as the earliest and most senior official who supported NATO enlargement, 
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake also showed heavy republican security influences in his 
foreign policy views. In an October 1993 speech that sought to define a grand vision for 
Clinton’s foreign policy, Lake reiterated what Deudney calls the essential republican security 
insight of Woodrow Wilson: “[Wilson] understood that our own security is shaped by the 
character of foreign regimes,” and thus he understood that to survive international anarchy you 
needed, above all, to install republics.96 Lake pointed to the measure of violence interdependence 
when he argued that attempts at consolidating market democracies should be targeted at “places 
where we have the strongest security concerns and where we can make the greatest 
difference…with large economies, critical locations, nuclear weapons or the potential to generate 
refugee flows into our own nation or into key friends and allies.” Perhaps in a nod to debate 
within the administration over enlargement, Lake also said U.S. efforts “must be demand-driven 
– they must focus on nations whose people are pushing for reform or have already secured it.” 
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He pointed to countries in Central and Eastern Europe as a “clear example, given their proximity 
to the great democratic powers of Western Europe.”97 
 
 
The Choice to Enlarge and Republican Constraints on Violence 
 
 Seeing as how crucial administration officials offered republican security diagnoses and 
solutions early on, it is no surprise that those logics carried through as the policy process for 
NATO enlargement got underway. Christopher’s February 1993 speech, referenced above, 
showed that Clinton policy on NATO started at pretty much the identical point as the Bush 
administration had left it. The speech “essentially recycl[ed] ideas” pushed in 1991 and 1992 
about the need to operationalize the NATO-NACC relationship for peacekeeping and out-of-area 
missions.98 In this way Clinton’s NATO policy started with the republican security influences 
discussed in the first Bush administration.  
But that April, Clinton was struck by the desire of Central European leaders to join 
NATO, and seemed to consider NATO enlargement from that point on. Along with another 
Christopher speech to NATO allies in June calling for an official NATO summit in January 
1994, the April incident got the ball rolling on an interagency workgroup that would construct a 
comprehensive U.S. policy on the new NATO.99 This was the formal start of a debate within the 
administration that would take six months to resolve. It focused on the extent to which NATO 
should cooperate primarily with all European states that wanted to partner (though not 
necessarily join), versus giving clear signals and guidance to those who wanted to join NATO on 
a “fast-track.” 
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 In June 1993, it was fairly clear that Clinton supported enlargement sooner rather than 
later. At the start of the interagency meetings, it was announced that Clinton and National 
Security Advisor Anthony Lake both thought NATO expansion was good idea.100 When asked at 
a June 17, 1993 press conference whether he thought NATO was dead because of its inaction in 
Bosnia, Clinton retorted that “the clearest example I know to give you that NATO is not dead 
was provided by the leaders of all the Eastern European countries” – the leaders Clinton had met 
with earlier in April, all of whom “said their number one priority was to get into NATO.” 101 
When the reporter continued to ask what enemy NATO would expand against, Clinton argued 
for the material-contextual factor of violence interdependence as all that was necessary – that “all 
kinds of possible problems” were worth protecting against, “from terrorism, from the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, from yet unforeseen developments in countries 
around NATO.”102 Though it would be years before the policy was implemented, even this early 
Clinton was arguing that the effect of the membership carrot for non-NATO states was a clear 
example of why NATO should continue, and that the material-contextual conditions around the 
world in themselves constituted a good enough reason to enlarge NATO in the future.  
 The interagency debate resulted in an eventual consensus on what Clinton would say at 
the January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels. A lot of effort from the Pentagon’s end was 
figuring out how to make the diplomatic links created by the NACC operational. The result was 
officially rolled out during Clinton’s January trip to Europe: an American initiative called the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) that involved all NACC countries (including Russia) in new bilateral 
relationships with NATO. The inclusiveness of the NACC was present, but the bilateral aspect 
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made sure that NATO retained autonomous decision-making when it came to PfP matters. More 
importantly, the structure of cooperation was geared towards self-differentiation, in which states 
that wanted to prove themselves worthy of NATO security had the opportunity through more 
active participation.103  
 The PfP certainly had its intellectual roots in NATO policy from the Bush 
administration.104 It carried through the republican security roots as well, specifically in that the 
means of self-differentiation were geared towards installing domestic republican constraints in 
these new states. The view from the Pentagon was that “if any institutions had the power to block 
reform in former communist states, it would be the militaries,” and that the PfP could prove 
invaluable “if these militaries had incentives to cooperate with the West rather than oppose it.”105 
The objectives of the PfP were most clearly linked to republican restraints on the domestic use of 
force – transparency and democratic control of defense forces specifically – which came directly 
from the hierarchy-restraint insight that severe state centralization of defense and military forces 
is intolerable to security.106  
In addition, the adoption of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) at the Brussels 
summit added an instrumental element to participation in the PfP. Arising “from the changing 
security situation in Europe and the emergence of smaller but diverse and unpredictable risks to 
peace and stability,” the CJTF sought to establish interoperability between NATO and non-
NATO members for the purpose of small, rapid reaction forces seeking to quell escalating 
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conflicts or humanitarian disasters.107 The combined effect of the PfP and the CJTF was to 
establish a behavior regime in which states that made the most progress militarily and politically 
not only signaled themselves out for possible NATO membership, but simultaneously 
contributed to capability of NATO military actions. In this way, the PfP and the CJTF were 
geared towards the republican security objectives of installing the number of republican 
governments internationally, and mitigating spaces of intense anarchy-interdependence through 
out-of-area operations.  
 Without a concrete reason to self-differentiate it was unclear what exactly was supposed 
to motivate states to participate heavily in the PfP. This is why U.S. policymakers also decided to 
give a vague but clear nod to NATO enlargement during the January Brussels summit. At a press 
conference with leaders of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, President Clinton insisted 
that the PfP was not a “permanent holding room,” but rather that the cooperation program 
“changes the entire NATO dialog so that now the question is no longer whether NATO will take 
on new members but when and how.” 108 In one of his clearest statements infused with 
republican security logic, Clinton argued that the U.S. commitment “derives from more than our 
shared values and our admiration for your efforts. It also derives from our own security concerns. 
Let me be absolutely clear: The security of your states is important to the security of the United 
States.”109 Furthering this security over values logic, Clinton also defended the decision “not to 
immediately issue security guarantees…without knowing in any way, shape, or form whether the 
reciprocal obligations of NATO could be met by new members.” 
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The confirmation of eventual NATO enlargement in January represented a partial victory 
for those U.S. officials who were pushing for the fastest timeline for new memberships. These 
policymakers were concerned that the PfP, if it seemed like the closest any state would get to 
NATO security, would dampen the incentive for reform in new states. Unsurprisingly, 
administration officials who most heavily pushed enlargement during 1993 and 1994 also 
showed heavy republican security influences, especially in their desire to sharpen the incentives 
for democratic controls over defense forces by dangling the carrot of NATO membership. 
 Stephen Flanagan, a policy planning staffer in the State Department who had also worked 
for the Bush administration, was a major player in convincing Secretary Christopher to support a 
nod to enlargement at the Brussels summit.110 He also had forwarded his idea for NATO 
enlargement before Clinton had even taken office, and used republican security concepts to make 
his case. In opposing analysts who argued for a containment (i.e. avoidance) of instability in 
Central and Eastern Europe, Flanagan called such a policy “shortsighted, impracticable, and 
morally indefensible” because, above all, it would be “difficult to insulate Western Europe form 
these emerging instabilities.”111 In other words it was not the fundamental desire to spread 
Western values that should guide enlargement, but rather the very simple fact that the West must 
spread its values if it wanted to protection from inevitably spiraling and growing conflicts on its 
borders – a clear nod to anarchy-interdependence. As an effort to respond to these growing 
instabilities, Flanagan proposed a mix of democratic, geostrategic and political criteria that could 
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guide the criteria for new membership, “offered on the basis of the degree to which a given 
society had completed its transformation.”112  
 Although not part of the government, defense experts Ronald Asmus, F. Stephen 
Larrabee, and Richard Kugler wrote a paper in the journal Foreign Affairs, entitled “Building a 
New NATO,” that Warren Christopher claimed had an important influence on U.S. enlargement 
policy.113 Again anarchy-interdependence played a large role in the analysis. The three analysts 
argued that “unbalanced military forces and weapons inventories” in instable and conflict-filled 
nations had left a situation in which actors were now “capable of inflicting immense violence on 
the others.”114 The collapse of the Soviet Union caused “ideological mobilization alongside a 
security vacuum” that greatly enhanced the risks of “spillover” and larger state conflicts, making 
this new large zone of instability directly relevant to the security of NATO allies.115 The focus on 
a clear, conditional criteria for membership – focusing on democratic norms, civil-military 
controls, and minority rights – meant that “NATO can help solidify a zone of stability in Central 
Europe without undue risk of embroiling NATO’s existing members in new ethnic of intra-
regional conflicts.”116 
Other officials in the administration made similar arguments for the need to use the carrot 
of NATO membership as a tool to, as Deudney’s formulation has it, “install republics” in the 
international system.117 Specifically, it was clear by the time of PfP rollout that “the introduction 
of civilian control of the military [would] most clearly be linked to the prospect of NATO 
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membership” (emphasis added).118 Again, this desire to entrench republican constraints in new 
territories striving to join NATO was directly informed by the republican security concept of 
cobinding. As a solution to the problems of anarchy-interdependence and hierarchy-restraint, 
interstate unions are only viable between republics, and thus require the republican security 
objective of installing republican governments through the international system.  
  1994 consisted mainly of debates over the speed and clarity by which the administration 
was going to pursue NATO enlargement. Within the Clinton administration, amid bureaucratic 
changes favorable to enlargement advocates, officials like Richard Holbrooke and Anthony Lake 
jumped on Clinton’s enlargement statements from the January 1994 Europe trip and the 
President’s seeming embrace that June of timetables and membership criteria soon.119 By the end 
of the year it was clear throughout the entire administration and to the public that the President 
favored enlargement, and the questions that now remained were when to enlarge and what states 
would be included.120 On December 1, 1994, Secretary of State Christopher announced in a 
speech to NATO allies in Brussels that the U.S. now supported formal “internal deliberations on 
expansion and, in 1995, to discuss with Partners the obligations and implications of 
membership.”121 Though there was still much detail to be filled in on the “how” of enlargement, 
specifics on the ways new members would integrate operationally with NATO – the civil-
military relations, defense force constraints, and democratic practices highlighted in the PfP – 
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had already made the broad outlines of “how” NATO would integrate quite clear.  
 While the administration was busy dealing with the fallout from the enlargement 
announcement regarding the bilateral relationship with Russia, in addition to the worsening 
situation in Bosnia, enlargement slowed but was not abandoned in 1995 and 1996. January 1995 
began to see the emergence of the formal NATO-Russia council as a “parallel track” to 
enlargement policy – as a way to ensure enlargement occurred soon without creating 
irreconcilable riffs between the West and Russia.122 In June 1995, Russia was convinced to join 
the Partnership for Peace, leaving an opening for the administration to push ahead with 
enlargement. 
 Policy during 1995 solidified the republican security logic of NATO enlargement by 
making central the incentives for democratic reforms. In August 1995 Deputy Secretary of State 
Strobe Talbott published what amounted to the most up-to-date administration defense of NATO 
enlargement. Talbott described a major requirement for potential members as “full civilian 
control of the military… [that] armed forces must be professional, apolitical, and committed 
to…defensive purposes alone.”123  This included, according to Talbott, “parliamentary oversight 
of military affairs, and… civilians [in] senior defense positions.” Most importantly, Talbott 
wrote future members must “remain fully and irreversibly committed to such structures and 
principles.” It was in this consolidation of reform, followed by the NATO protection of these 
reforms, that Talbott saw “an expanded NATO [as] likely to extend the area in which conflicts 
like the one in the Balkans simply do not happen.”124 The republican security objectives of 
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expanding the space in which major violent conflicts do not occur and installing more republican 
governments internationally are clear here. 
The “Study on NATO Enlargement” released in September 1995 finally set in stone the 
republican security logic that U.S. policymakers had been pushing. The very first contribution of 
enlargement, according to the study, was the “support of democratic reforms, including civilian 
and democratic control over the military.”125 Also important was the increased “transparency in 
defense planning and military budgets, thereby reducing the likelihood of instability that might 
be engendered by an exclusively national approach to defense policies.”126 Unsurprisingly, the 
touted benefits of enlargement closely mimicked the general criteria spelled out in the study for 
accepting new members, which included heavy emphasis on the military activities of prospective 
members.127 Both benefits and criteria were fully informed by the hierarchy-restraint concept 
from republican security, which sees grave sources of insecurity in centralized and undemocratic 
military practices, and aimed to install republican governments in Eastern Europe.  
In addition, the Study on Enlargement “sought to leverage the lure of membership to 
encourage the resolution of long-standing ethnic and border disputes,” making the resolution of 
such issues an important factor in membership decisions.128 This aspect of the study was geared 
towards the republican security objectives of expanding the space in which major conflicts don’t 
occur because of NATO protection, and boosting NATO’s capability to respond to out-of-area 
conflicts.  
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Perhaps the most important part of the September 1995 study was what it didn’t do: there 
was no explicit, rigid checklist of criteria for membership. The point was to ensure that NATO 
would never be completely locked in to granting membership to a state that met all the 
requirements in the study.129 The specific list of countries that were going to join NATO in its 
first round of enlargement, then, would remain unclear until concrete invitations were handed 
out.  For the next year and a half, the administration would be fairly adamant on the importance 
of not specifically naming the “who” aspect of enlargement. The reason given was that any 
concrete list of who was going to join and who was not would only serve to dilute the very 
mechanism of incentives that NATO enlargement was supposed to produce.130 If the PfP began 
to look like the closest place most states would get to NATO, so the argument went, what was 
the incentive for working harder and better at the PfP activities? 
This combination of PfP and NATO membership as a carrot instigated a variety of 
workshops and seminars focused most on defense and political reforms. A few years later, in 
1997 alone, there were 63 different works on defense reform of civil-military relations held 
through the PfP.131 Though the results of these programs are debatable, there is little doubt that 
the intention of policymakers was to influence the number of republican governments populating 
the international system, a clear objective of republican security theory.  
 The rest of 1995 and 1996 consisted mainly of reasons to delay the enlargement 
decisions.132 Russian anger over enlargement, combined with Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s 
shaky reelection prospects forced Clinton to drag his feet on enlargement. The violence in 
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Bosnia also served as a psychological block on enlargement, only lifted with the signing of the 
Dayton Accords. Finally, by the fall of 1996, the U.S. was ready to push forward with 
enlargement. The plan was to announce the invited members at the NATO Summit in Madrid in 
the summer of 1997. 
 
 
The Decision in Madrid 
 
Based on the general criteria for NATO membership – laid out implicitly during the Bush 
administration and the first two years of Clinton’s term, then explicitly in the 1995 Enlargement 
Study – the only choice faced by U.S. policymakers in the spring of 1997 was whether to 
recommend three or five countries for NATO enlargement. Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia were the realistic possibilities.  
From the view of U.S. policymakers, there were more advantages to a small enlargement, 
at least generally. First, smaller enlargement would cause less tension in the bilateral U.S.-
Russian relationship by drawing out the eventual question of Baltic state NATO memberships, a 
sore point in Moscow. It would also cost fewer U.S. dollars, making the necessary Senate 
ratification more likely. Finally, such a small round could potentially act as a signal that 
numerous rounds were coming in the future, which would act to keep the domestic reform 
incentive strong. The general logic was given a name, coined by Ronald Asmus, now working 
for the State Department: “Small is Beautiful, Plus Robust Open Door.”133 
 As the most advanced politically and militarily, plus the closest to Western Europe 
geographically, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were the clear and obvious candidates. 
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The real question was whether to include Slovenia and/or Romania in the first round of 
enlargement. The majority of NATO members, led by France and Italy, supported a five state 
first round.134  
In June of 1997, only a month before the NATO summit in Madrid scheduled to 
announce the invited countries, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced the U.S. 
decision to NATO Defense Ministers in Brussels: the U.S. would support inviting only three new 
countries in Madrid. Slovenia and Romania would have to wait for the next round of 
enlargement. Already inclined to pursue a smaller enlargement, the Clinton administration 
decided against including Romania in the first round because of its shortfall in political and 
economic reforms.135 The President laid out the Romania rationale in an interview with European 
journalists a few days before the Madrid summit – while the three invited members “have 
already been through the ups and downs” politically and economically, Romanian reform had 
only really taken hold for a year, and Clinton decided on the need to “give them a couple of years 
to stabilize their democracy, to develop their economy.”136   
Slovenia was a harder choice. There was fairly widespread agreement that Slovenia’s 
political progress and socialization was clearly not reason to exclude it, as it was with Romania. 
Even the Pentagon included Slovenia in their cost calculations for enlargement based on this 
assumption. Additionally Slovenia offered the geostrategic advantage of contiguity with 
Hungary, and Slovenia’s inclusion, it was argued, would set a great example for other former 
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Yugoslavian states that there were in fact rewards to be reaped from the PfP process.137 But the 
Slovenia military was very small, and its lack of military infrastructure, as well as the evident 
Hungarian contribution to Bosnia peacekeeping without it, made the “contiguity to Hungary” for 
argument less convincing.138 Administration officials confirmed that it was indeed the lack of 
effective military capability that pushed Slovenia out of the first round.139  
The choice to exclude Slovenia ultimately required instrumental calculations on the part 
of the administration and NATO.  Clinton, in defending the choice for a three-state enlargement 
before the Madrid Summit, emphasized the military considerations for membership.  The 
President argued that NATO “is primarily a military alliance,” and that it was “quite important 
on principle that we not admit anyone until we’re absolutely sure that their democracy is stable 
and that they are militarily capable… We have to remember, this alliance is the most successful 
alliance in history because it’s had military as well as political integrity.”140  
 
Testing Perspectives on 1997 Enlargement 
It is at this point that I return to the theoretical perspectives introduced at the beginning of 
the paper. Here I will test the primacy perspective, the constructivist perspective, the specific 
realist argument, and the cooperative security perspective against the history of NATO 
enlargement. I also lay out how the republican security perspective on the membership criteria 
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used by U.S. policymakers leading up to Madrid reveals it to be the most explanatory perspective 
on NATO enlargement.  
Primacy is fairly consistent with U.S. NATO policy for the first half of the nineties. It 
accurately predicts the effort by U.S. policymakers since the Cold War to work for the 
maintenance of NATO’s preeminent role in Europe, as a way to ensure that U.S. power is still 
felt throughout the continent. It also is consistent with the effort to integrate Central and Eastern 
Europeans countries into the multilateral institutions of the West.141 Although advocates of 
primacy argued for NATO enlargement as a kind of “neo-containment” aimed solely at the 
Russians, it also seemed clear at the time that these same advocates saw very little actual, current 
threat coming from Moscow.142 Combine that with the fact that primacy advocates wanted a 
broader and more ambitious agenda for NATO enlargement than the administration was 
following, and it seems the primacy perspective has a deeper explanation for NATO enlargement 
than Russia: “the desire to anchor the U.S. in a diplomatic enterprise that will preserve and widen 
its involvement in European and international affairs, simply because this is viewed as an 
unalloyed good in its own right.”143 The primacy perspective, in other words, views enlargement 
as a stalking horse, “nothing more than the adaptation of a politically familiar vehicle to the task 
of preserving U.S. primacy.”144 As for a prediction, then, a primacy perspective expects that the 
U.S. would support the largest and widest NATO enlargement that it could practically achieve.  
It is at this point that I rule out the primacy perspective as the best explanation for U.S. 
policy on NATO enlargement. Rather than a calculated attempt at spreading the preponderance 
of U.S. power as far and wide as possible throughout Europe, enlargement policy was a much 
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more cautious affair. If the Russians were not a real threat, as primacy advocates seemed to 
argue, what was stopping the U.S. from immediately granting NATO memberships to the Baltic 
states? That would only serve to further the scope and influence of U.S. power preponderance, 
without the short-term risk of Russian intransigence. The primacy perspective would also not 
predict the exclusion of Slovenia and Romania from NATO based on a detailed judgment of 
those countries’ democratic reforms and military – if a country was that close to membership, a 
primacy advocate would surely just admit it, and allow U.S. muscle to provide the protection as 
the country caught up to NATO standards. With its “stalking horse” account of NATO 
enlargement, primacy simply comes up short in explaining the cautious and instrumental-based 
enlargement decisions by the Clinton administration.  
Constructivism is also convincing on NATO enlargement policy up to this point. Unlike 
other IR theories, the constructivist argument on enlargement would be directly contradicted by a 
history in which NATO opted not to include countries that shared its values.145 The fact that 
NATO opened its doors starting in 1994 and clearly put democratic norms and values forward as 
general criteria by which to judge potential future members is precisely what a constructivist 
perspective would predict. Furthermore, the “socialization” process built into enlargement policy 
is highly consistent with constructivism – using NATO membership as “an incentive to further 
pursue democratic reform and consolidation of the transformation of their domestic systems,” 
and to spread the norms of multilateral international law.146 Regarding the actual decision of 
what countries are allowed into NATO, constructivism also offers a useful prediction: the 
countries that are fastest to internalize the values and norms shared by NATO allies are the 
countries that join. 
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However, although there is much to be said for a values-based reading of enlargement, 
constructivism has a difficult time accounting for the instrumental rationales behind the decisions 
made in the spring of 1997. Constructivism is not contradicted by the decision to leave out 
Romania, since it was justified by a deficit of democratic reforms that represent the values-based 
perspective of constructivism. Yet, because the liberalization and democratization record meant 
“the exclusion of Slovenia [could not] be justified on the basis of insufficient socialization…the 
constructivist explanation does not sufficiently account for the choice of new members.”147  
Republican security theory does a better job of accounting for these instrumental 
considerations. In this perspective, the primary objectives for an enlargement decision are the 
extent to which a membership offer, right now, (a) decreases the likelihood that NATO will have 
to respond to conflicts within the new member state, and (b) increases the ability of NATO to 
respond quickly and preemptively to conflicts outside of the new member state. With these 
objectives in mind, the criteria for a new NATO member are clearly seen as instrumental: 
“adequate republican constraints” on the domestic government are required, and “adequate 
military capability” is also required. In other words, the ideal outcome for NATO enlargement 
policy is the situation of states throughout Europe that are characterized by republican 
government and capable militaries. The tables below summarize the constructivist and 
republican security perspectives on the 1997 enlargement: 
Table 3. Constructivist Perspective on 1997 NATO Enlargement 
 
“Enough” shared identities “Not enough” shared identities 
NATO offers membership 
• Incorrectly predicts invitation to Slovenia  
NATO does not offer membership 
• Correctly predicts no invitation to Romania  
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Table 4. Republican Security Perspective on 1997 NATO Enlargement 
 
 “Capable” military capacity Lack of “capable” military 
“Enough” republican constraints on 
domestic military and government 
NATO offers membership Somewhat unlikely NATO offers 
membership  
• eg, Slovenia 
“Not enough” republican 
constraints on domestic military and 
government 
Highly unlikely NATO offers 
membership 
• eg, Romania 
NATO does not offer membership 
 
 
Admitting a state with too few republican constraints into NATO would increase the 
likelihood that NATO would have to respond to a crisis within that state. If the new member 
government is “too anarchical” it will not be able to quell insecurity by itself. If it were “too 
hierarchical” then, as per the hierarchy-restraint logic, the government would create its own 
sources of insecurity through the illiberal and concentrated use of power. This would create an 
undesirable choice for NATO – fight against a NATO ally government, or allow the continued 
hierarchical use of force that would undoubtedly, in the future, prove untenable from a security 
perspective. In addition, it is unlikely that a government without republican practices or values 
would contribute at all to NATO’s efforts to mitigate anarchy in other spaces, through out-of-
area operations. Here, the relatively short period of Romanian democratic reforms meant that 
Romania did not yet meet U.S. requirements for “adequate republican constraints.” In this way 
the decision to exclude Romania from the first enlargement round is consistent with a republican 
security perspective. 
 Granting a NATO security guarantee to a state with too incapable a military, even if it 
shares democratic values, would mean an increase in the likelihood that NATO is dragged into 
security crises within the borders of the new member state. Rather than lock itself permanently 
into protecting the militarily weak government, withholding NATO membership for the time 
being does nothing to reduce NATO capability in responding to a necessary security crisis within 
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the state, yet also avoids the possibility of overextending NATO forces for unnecessary security 
problems because the new member state is too weak to respond (sapping NATO resources that 
may be needed for acute insecurities in other areas). The added risk that NATO security could 
spur weaker governments to start unnecessary conflicts (say, with Russia) also is not to be 
ignored. Finally, it is clear that a new NATO member with inadequate military capacity offers 
very little contribution to mitigating violence spaces of anarchy elsewhere. 
Republican security theory is thus consistent with giving NATO memberships to Poland, 
the Czech Republic, and Hungary. As the most contiguous with Western Europe, hypothetical 
anarchic space would represent the highest level of anarchy-interdependence for NATO and the 
U.S. No matter how stable or instable these are, it is still a worthy republican security goal to 
make sure that they stay as stable as possible in the future. As the most advanced in republican 
constraints and military capabilities, protecting the regimes in these three countries with NATO 
security guarantees unquestionably decreases the likelihood of conflict in these states requiring 
large NATO military adventures or U.S. isolation sometime down the road. Also, because they 
are the most advanced democratically and capable militarily, these three new members can 
provide help to NATO in going out-of-area 
Note that the dual criteria of “adequate republican constraints” and “adequate military 
capability” can be interactive: a more republican or democratic state is inherently less likely to 
see sources of insecurity or conflicts spark up within their borders, thus lessening the salience of 
a capable military. This means, no doubt, the “republican constraints” criterion is the more 
important of the two. However, a threshold of military capability is still necessary in theory 
regardless of republican character, because the future is unpredictable, capabilities of destruction 
are high, and even a republican government cannot guarantee that it will not experience severe 
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internal conflict in the future. NATO, in that case, would prefer the domestic government have 
capabilities to contribute in controlling a crisis within its borders. Also, of course, NATO would 
prefer a net-positive contribution to its out-of-area capabilities, though such a contribution is less 
important.  
With this in mind, then, the republican security perspective is consistent with a very close 
but ultimately instrumental calculation to exclude Slovenia based on its weak military. Although 
the republican character of Slovenia was not called into question – and to be sure Slovenia was 
more likely than a stronger but less-republican state to join NATO – its lack of military 
infrastructure could simply not ensure that NATO was not getting itself into a detrimental 
relationship, where it would be locked in to managing violence in Slovenia all on its own. The 
republican security criteria for NATO membership require a combination of republican character 
and military capability – what the exact extent of each must be for membership changes from 
state to state. Thus, while the republican security perspective cannot predict that Slovenia would 
not join NATO in 1997, it does a much better job at explaining why Slovenia was not allowed 
into NATO than other perspectives. Republican security theory provides the best theoretical 
description of the decision making process, and the metrics used to make the enlargement 
decisions.  
 The fact that Slovenia is so close to the Balkans would perhaps make it a more likely 
candidate for a NATO enlargement based around violence interdependence, as the republican 
security perspective posits. Yet the political fact was enlargement could not truly be on the table 
until a relative peace in the Balkans had been achieved, and the Dayton Accords in 1995 was one 
of the incidents that allowed enlargement to proceed at a faster pace later in 1997.148 By the time 
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of the Slovenia decision, it was the case that measuring the stability of a potential new NATO 
member – rather than the extent to which that new member could contribute to the mitigation of 
international anarchy – was the bigger priority for NATO enlargement. In republican security 
terms, enlargement policy was putting a bigger emphasis on the expansion of republican 
governments than it was on the ability to mitigate out-of-area conflicts. 
There is also a plausible realist argument to be made at this point: all this talk of violence 
interdependence was merely a useful excuse for the U.S. to enlarge NATO towards Russian 
borders, and NATO enlargement is just another instance of one state striving for relative gains 
over a rival state. This realist perspective is not as convincing as republican security theory, 
however. First, it relies on an exaggeration of how threatened U.S. policymakers actually were 
by Russian imperialism in 1994. While its true that some U.S. officials used the argument that 
enlargement could act as a long term hedge against renewed Russian aggression, these arguments 
tended to be offered in domestic political settings, and the administration received the most 
pressure politically from those who wanted to be hawkish on Russia.149 Actual U.S. policy was 
of course far more cooperative with Russia than realists would expect. What is the realist 
explanation, for instance, of all the NATO-Russian efforts at cooperation and the bilateral U.S.-
Russian arms control agreements that were enacted during this time? There isn’t an obvious 
realist reason why NATO enlargement in particular was used to achieve relative gains over 
Russia, while a host of other U.S. policies strived towards cooperation and absolute gains.  
Additionally, as Henry Nau writes, “by realist logic, the countries to defend, because they are 
most exposed to Russian aggression, are the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Belarus, not Poland, 
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Hungary, and the Czech Republic.”150 This particular realist view would predict a “farthest first” 
enlargement that at least included the Baltic states, instead of the incremental and republican-
based choices of the 1997 enlargement. 
Finally, the cooperative security perspective is completely consistent with the entirety of 
Clinton’s NATO enlargement policy. There is little doubt that U.S. policymakers expanded and 
transformed NATO, as Posen and Ross write, in order to respond to imminent threats, deter those 
who break the peace, and “to bring the practice of cooperative security to Eastern Europe, to 
strengthen the web of diplomatic, economic, and security arrangements” in the region.151  
The main issue with this perspective, however, is that its description of motives is far too 
broad. To say that the U.S. enlarged an international institution in order to spread the practice of 
cooperation is to say not much at all. The high level of “strategic interdependence” posited by 
cooperative security advocates includes the material factor of violence interdependence, but does 
not signal it out. Therefore, it is unclear why the U.S. would focus on security institutions, versus 
economic institutions, or legal and political institutions. Cooperative security simply suggests far 
too broad an agenda. 
Consequently, there is some confusion as to whether a cooperative security advocate 
would in fact support NATO enlargement at all, if that policy were seen as hampering other 
cooperative security initiatives. Henry Nau, in his writing on foreign policy, argues 
“internationalists,” his phrase for cooperative security advocates who favor arms control and 
economic cooperation, “oppose NATO expansion by exaggerating the threat to Russian 
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democracy, the adverse impact on liberal forces in Russia.”152 There is no reason, in other words, 
that a cooperative security advocate would push for NATO enlargement at the expense of 
relations with Russia.  
Nau, Posen and Ross, then, are at a crossroads. Both recognize the existence of the 
cooperative security camp in U.S. foreign policy, yet there is no agreement over the camp’s view 
on NATO enlargement. Demonstrating the confusion, cooperative security advocates like Bill 
Clinton and Madeline Albright supported NATO enlargement, while Democratic Senator Sam 
Nunn, a fierce advocate for arms control and Russian cooperation, ended up opposing the 
initiative for fear of its adverse impact on Russian politics.153  
The republican security perspective puts the central focus on violence interdependence. 
As a result, it better points to the specific U.S. motivation, using NATO enlargement to prevent 
spiraling conflicts and arms proliferation throughout Europe, and to install republican 
governments there in order to avoid these conflicts in the future. Because of the more acute 
source of violence interdependence in the areas between Western Europe and Russia, rather than 
from within Russia itself, a republican security perspective expects NATO enlargement to at 
least move forward slowly even in the face of Russian unrest. Additionally, because the theory 
points to the need to protect only the most consolidated of republican states with NATO security, 
republican security offers an explanation for the pattern and incremental nature in the 
enlargement process. There is no such explanation forthcoming from the cooperative security 
perspective.  
In short, while the cooperative security prospective offers a useful and clear description 
of the strategy of the Clinton administration regarding institutions generally, it does not offer a 
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sufficient description of the specific motivations put forth by U.S. policymakers as they chose to 
expand NATO.  
 
The End of the Clinton Administration  
The rest of Clinton’s presidency, with regards to NATO, consisted mainly of solidifying 
Senate ratification for enlargement during 1998, and dealing with the bombing campaign in 
Kosovo during 1999. Yet there were also efforts to make sure that the next round of enlargement, 
though not to be overseen by Clinton, did not get thrown off track. Starting with the Madrid 
Declaration, issued in 1997 as NATO announced its first round of invitations, there was an 
explicit reference to leaving NATO’s door open in order to not discourage aspirants excluded in 
the first round.154 
 This effort to ensure the incentives for reform so crucial to the enlargement policy were 
not diluted culminated in the spring of 1999. First, at a ceremony for the three new members at 
the Truman Presidential Library in March, Secretary of State Albright insisted that the nations 
joining NATO “are the first new members since the Cold War’s end, but they will not be the last. 
For NATO enlargement is an event, not a process.”155 In her speech, Albright once again spelled 
out the republican security objectives of enlargement. She described NATO enlargement as “a 
sign that we have not grown complacent about protecting the security of our citizens” – a 
security now characterized by threats that are “less predictable…from an aggressive regime, a 
rampaging faction or a terrorist group…[from] weapons [that] will be more destructive at longer 
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distances than ever before.”156 In response to this clear anarchy-interdependence reference, 
Albright argued NATO enlargement sought expand the zone of peace and security throughout 
Europe, “to do for Europe’s east what NATO has already helped to do for Europe’s west. 
Steadily and systematically…erasing without replacing the line drawn in Europe.”157  
 The next month NATO held a summit in Washington to celebrate the 50th anniversary of 
the alliance. Though the event was shrouded by the on-going bombing campaign in Kosovo, 
there were important republican security measures taken up at the summit, including a 
strengthening of the republican reform regime that the enlargement process had established. In 
his address, President Clinton assured non-members that NATO was “remaining open to new 
members from the Baltics to the Black Sea.”158  
This promise was made concrete by the creation of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) – 
a program setup to provide individual assistance and guidance to all countries wishing to join the 
alliance. Through reports and a back and forth feedback process between allies and aspirant 
members, the MAP program focused most on the defense/military field and “a defense planning 
approach for aspirants.”159 Nine aspirant states – including the Baltics and the two states who just 
missed membership the first time around, Romania and Slovenia – began individual MAP 
programs. It is clear that the MAP setup was meant to strengthen the incentive and the 
effectiveness of republican constraints on violence in these aspirant countries, making the 
“assessment process more structured and rigorous” and drawing heavily from the lessons learned 
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in the first enlargement round.160 At the same time, it was announced that no new rounds of 
enlargement were to be considered until 2002. Combined with the MAP and the “open door” 
statements, it seemed by the end of Clinton’s term that “although the decision to enlarge has 
been postponed, on paper NATO remain[ed] firmly committed to expansion.”161 
In the conclusion of his speech at the Washington Summit, President Clinton neatly 
summed up the core republican security insight driving NATO enlargement:  
 
“Almost 100 years ago, President Theodore Roosevelt said something that could well be 
applied to a united Europe and to our united transatlantic Alliance today. Of America’s 
coming of age in the world, he said, ‘We have no choice as to whether we will play a 
great part in the world. That has been determined for us by fate, by the march of events. 
The only question is whether we will play it well or ill.’”162 
     
In his advocacy for the spread of a unified and democratic Europe, if only because America had 
no other choice, Bill Clinton pursued a republican security policy in his leadership on NATO 
enlargement.  
* * *  
 
The second Bush administration oversaw the largest round of NATO enlargement in 
2002. I focus on the quick embrace by the Bush team of Clinton’s NATO enlargement policy, as 
a way to show the continuity of republican security theory thinking between the two 
presidencies. I then show how September 11th facilitated a wider round of enlargement then 
expected, which placed a heavier emphasis on mitigating out-of-area anarchies while still 
fulfilling the two core goals of NATO enlargement – extending the space in which the U.S. does 
not have to fight major wars, and installing more republican governments in the international 
system. Republican security theory, with its heavy focus on violence interdependence, is shown 
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to provide a better explanation of post-9/11 enlargement decisions than other theoretical 
perspectives. Finally, I end with an appraisal of the primacy and cooperative security 
perspectives, arguing that the continuity of republican security theory throughout enlargement 
policy suggests it is the superior perspective in looking at NATO enlargement.  
 
The Embrace of NATO Enlargement in the Second Bush Administration  
 As they entered office Bush administration officials laid out a specific view of U.S. 
security policy and republican security concepts, focusing most on anarchy-interdependence in a 
new era of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In his first policy speech on NATO, given in 
Virginia only three weeks into the administration, President Bush signaled his belief in the need 
for an activist U.S. security policy due to highly mobile and destructive forms of technology. 
Stating that “transatlantic security and stability is a vital American interest,” Bush proceeded to 
described the “dangers of a new era” that did not dissipate with the Cold War, particularly “the 
grave threat from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons” coming from less predictable and 
more diverse actors.163 In arguing that the U.S. “must confront the threats” posed by weapons on 
a missile or that come in a shipping container, Bush outlined his view of U.S. anarchy-
interdependence.  
Other officials shared this view, particularly Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. 
Upon entering office he initiated a review of U.S. strategic doctrine resulting in a major shift of 
emphasis to “21st century hybrid threats, like mass destruction terrorism,” that thrived on the 
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technologies of destruction so central to the concept of violence interdependence.164 Indeed, an 
important aspect of the first months of the administration was trying to shape European 
perceptions of what American officials saw as the real source of extreme violence 
interdependence – reports even described Rumsfeld as “a modern-day Paul Revere, crisscrossing 
the continent to warn of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the urgent need to 
act.”165 This specifically American view of anarchy-interdependence would play an important 
role in formulating NATO enlargement policy after the terrorist attacks on September 11th.  
Continuing the republican security logic of his predecessors, Bush showed a clear 
preference for keeping the U.S. involved in European security through NATO primacy. The 
response to a proposed European Rapid Reaction Force (EERF), a European Union initiative of 
60,000 troops meant for peacekeeping but autonomous from NATO, was the same as it always 
was. The U.S. supported more European defense spending, but preferred it to be within and 
complementary to NATO – “as long as it strengthens NATO, not weakens it,” in the words of 
Secretary of State Colin Powell.166 Bush aides made it clear that they favored a strong NATO, 
and began to consider the possibility of rescinding a campaign threat to pullout of U.S. troops 
from Bosnia peacekeeping, as a way “to protect the American leadership role in NATO and 
maintain NATO’s priority over the European Union.”167 The aversion to isolationism – from the 
hierarchy-restraint rationale – was evident here.  
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The EERF and its relation to NATO in terms of authority and autonomy primarily 
occupied early meetings between Bush, Blair and German Chancellor Schroeder. In both 
meetings Bush pushed for and received assurances that the EERF would operate only when 
NATO chose not to, ensuring the primacy of NATO (and thus U.S.) decision-making.168  But 
Washington also viewed the EERF as a way to bolster European defense spending that NATO 
membership had yet to foster, showing the aversion to pure hegemonic and unilateral 
preponderance.169 In favoring NATO primacy, U.S. policymakers once again pushed a vehicle 
for cobinding (a republican security strategy) that would be most responsive to the specific U.S. 
perception of violence interdependence – which was shifting towards the WMD-focus shown 
above, and steadily away from European perceptions.170  
The Bush administration took little time to endorse U.S. policy on NATO enlargement as 
Clinton left it; consequently, all of the republican security objectives that the enlargement 
process strived for continued into the Bush presidency. There were early signs of this continuity. 
First, Secretary Powell, National Security Adviser (NSA) Condoleezza Rice, and Deputy NSA 
Stephen Hadley were all members of the U.S. Committee on NATO, a nonprofit organization 
formed in 1996 to support NATO enlargement and push for Senate ratification.171 Rice again 
confirmed her support for an open NATO door to eastern European democracies in an article she 
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wrote for Foreign Affairs in January 2000.172 During the 2000 campaign, Bush himself pledged 
support for enlargement, though without filling in details of exactly who or when.173 Perhaps 
most importantly, former Clinton official and Ambassador to Poland, Daniel Fried, was hired to 
be Director for European and Eurasian Affairs on Bush’s National Security Council. As a strong 
enlargement advocate during the Clinton years, this was an important early signal of Bush’s 
enlargement policy.174  
All this pointed to the inevitable. Despite some positions early on that caused rifts 
between the U.S. and other NATO allies, once in office the Bush administration confirmed 
support for NATO enlargement quite quickly. Powell, during his Senate confirmation hearings, 
confirmed that the Bush administration would support NATO enlargement, but offered few 
specifics.175 Only a month into the first term, Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair put out a 
joint statement affirming their intention “to admit to [NATO’s] ranks European democracies 
prepared to assume the responsibilities of membership.”176 In May 2001, the President responded 
to a gathering of all the MAP countries by insisting “no country would be left out on grounds of 
its history or place on the map,” an encouraging sign especially for Baltic states looking to join 
NATO despite Russian resistance to the idea.177   
The first major policy statements on enlargement came during Bush’s first Presidential 
trip to Europe in June 2001. While many issues divided the U.S. and its NATO allies during this 
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trip – ranging from the administration’s missile defense plan, to its hard-line on the EERF and 
NATO primacy, plus other non-security issues like the environment – NATO enlargement 
continued on a relatively smooth track.178 At a press conference with NATO Secretary General 
Lord Robertson on June 13, 2001, Bush made it known that he believed “all European 
democracies” that want to join NATO and meet its standards “should have the opportunity to do 
so without red lines or outside veto.”179 He also confirmed that the U.S. government supported 
the expansion of NATO specifically because the U.S. “understands not only the history of 
NATO but the importance for NATO as we go down the road.”  
 Though the specific list of MAP states to be invited into NATO at the 2002 summit 
remained murky, two days later Bush signaled U.S. support for a large expansion in his address 
in Warsaw, Poland. In the speech, the President repeated Clinton’s words when he pointed to 
democracies “from the Baltics to the Black Sea and all that lie in between” as those who deserve 
the opportunity to join NATO, and argued that in planning the next enlargement NATO leaders 
“should not calculate how little we can get away with but how much we can do to advance the 
cause of freedom.”180 In addition to this clear sign that NATO would eventually include former 
Soviet allies (Romania, Bulgaria) and former Soviet republics (the Baltic states of Estonia, 
Lithuania, and Latvia), Bush also stated that “the Europe we are building must include Ukraine,” 
directly pointing to the possibility of a major, non-MAP state joining NATO one day down the 
road. NATO expansion, the President concluded, “has fulfilled NATO's promise, and that 
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promise now leads eastward and southward, northward and onward.”181  
 The speech in Warsaw finally left no doubt that Bush would continue the republican 
security objectives for NATO enlargement. The language of the speech, according to 
administration officials, was consciously designed to deepen the incentives for republican reform 
in MAP states, by flashing the possibility of a robust enlargement that would both come soon 
and not be the last round.182 Unsurprisingly, former Clinton official and Bush NSC staffer Daniel 
Fried took the lead in drafting the Warsaw speech, indicating the sincerity of the Bush 
enlargement policy and its “Clintonesque” nature.183 The next day, after a seemingly successful 
and pleasant meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, administration officials cheered the 
fact that Bush had clearly signaled “one day that NATO was expanding – and this meant 
everyone – and the next day it was all smiles with Putin.”184 
After the European trip, it was quite clear that “for all the differences between the foreign 
policies of the Bush administration and the Clinton administration, policy toward NATO 
enlargement has been one area of significant continuity.”185 In only his first six months in office 
President Bush decisively backed NATO enlargement, and begun the process of further 
extending the space in which the U.S. would never have to fight major conflicts. In embracing 
the MAP process, he continued the incentives for republican reforms that contributed to the 
installation of republican governments internationally. Both goals were republican security in 
nature, and both were to be achieved through the policy of robust NATO enlargement.  
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9/11, the New Violence Interdependence, and 7 New NATO Members 
 
The show of U.S. support for a big enlargement in June 2001 prompted consideration 
within the administration over which states to support at the NATO Summit in Prague, scheduled 
for November 2002. In between, of course, came the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001. 
Within days of the attack, NATO for the first time in its history invoked Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, in which allies pledged to defend any NATO member under attack. The U.S. 
military operation in Afghanistan and other anti-terror issues meant enlargement was relegated to 
the background of U.S.-NATO relations for the remainder of 2001.  
 Yet only a few months into 2002 the administration reaffirmed its support of 
enlargement. By February it was generally accepted – especially in light of Putin and Russia’s 
wave of cooperation following 9/11 – that the Baltic states, Slovakia, and Slovenia were going to 
be invited to join NATO at the Prague summit, while Romania and Bulgaria were yet to receive 
explicit support from Washington.186 In March Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas 
Feith re-committed the U.S. to “an enlarged Alliance that conducts joint defense and operational 
planning, promotes interoperability, and encourages realistic training exercises,” while in May 
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Bush repeated his Warsaw language by pledging to lay foundations for “a Europe that is whole 
and free and at peace” and Colin Powell said the U.S. remained hopeful for “a robust round of 
enlargement at Prague.”187 
 Though U.S. support for NATO enlargement had not changed since 9/11, the perceptions 
of the security environment clearly had. A variety of policy and rhetorical shifts coming from 
Washington indicated a newly aggressive and preventive U.S. foreign policy that sought to wage 
a “war on terror” and defeat the rogue regimes of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea that formed an 
“axis of evil.” From a republican security perspective, the attacks on September 11th introduced a 
whole new perception of U.S. violence interdependence, showing the extent to which capabilities 
of destruction, communication, and transportation could all converge to exert acute insecurity on 
American soil.188 
For an administration already inclined to view acute anarchy-interdependence from 
WMD and anarchic or hierarchic territories outside of Europe – rather than from spiraling ethnic 
conflicts in Europe that was the focus of policymakers in the early nineties – September 11th 
altered the way in which policymakers approached the NATO enlargement process in predictable 
ways. According to a State Department official, the enlargement rationale from Bush’s June ’01 
Warsaw still held after 9/11 – “we can’t assume that European history has stopped,” warned the 
official  - but the events of that day also made it clear that a Europe whole and free was 
important but “no longer enough.”189  
 The Prague Summit now had a dual purpose for American officials. The question of new 
memberships would be settled, yes. But perhaps more importantly, this was an opportunity to 
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push onto NATO allies the U.S. view that WMD “present as much of an ‘existential threat’…as 
the Warsaw Pact divisions” and that with the now extreme levels of violence interdependence, 
“NATO needs to be ready for anything.”190 Towards that end, Bush officials flipped the agenda 
of the meeting to focus first on military and security capabilities necessary in a post-September 
11th world, and only second on the extension of new memberships. Furthermore, NATO 
enlargement could now no longer be separated from this increased importance of capabilities.   
Throughout 2002, leading up to the fall summit in Prague, administration officials used 
the new “war on terror” paradigm to assess the criteria of states aspiring to become NATO 
members. The Pentagon, despite general apathy towards NATO abilities, began a genuine 
evaluation of the contributions aspirant members could provide to Washington’s new foreign 
policy.191 Driving this process in particular was the perceived military and strategic benefits that 
new NATO members Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary had recently provided, as well 
as the realization that aspirant members were taking steps to appear more helpful to Washington 
in its war on terrorism.192 Because the U.S. now viewed potential new members as providing “a 
platform with which to project power,” in the words of U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas 
Burns, these potential benefits also seemed to heighten the opportunity cost of a limited 
enlargement in the eyes of U.S. policymakers.193  
  “Niche capabilities” became the new buzzword for enlargement criteria. U.S. 
policymakers saw an opportunity to use NATO membership as a way to develop specific and 
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useful military capabilities in new member states, depending on the relative strengthens and 
weaknesses for each members.194 This focus on specialized, niche capabilities stemmed from the 
dilemma the Pentagon faced in “squaring the need for military efficiency with the President’s 
wish for inclusiveness” in his NATO enlargement policy statements.”195 By ensuring that each 
new member could at least contribute something specifically useful in the new security 
environment, U.S. policymakers could continue the intra-European benefits of NATO 
enlargement while adding simultaneously to NATO’s out-of-area capabilities. NATO 
Ambassador Nicholas Burns labeled this “the new, more modern argument for enlargement,” 
that it provided NATO with new allies “with whom to fight and keep the peace in Europe and 
beyond.”196 
 In May 2002, following the pattern of history during the Clinton years, a NATO-Russia 
Joint Council once again exemplified Moscow’s cooperation and the lack of true risk in 
admitting the former Soviet republics into NATO.197 By September 2002, the decision to invite 
seven new members into NATO had been reached, the result of “a concerted push by the Bush 
administration.”198 Seven out of the nine countries participating in the MAP program were to be 
included – leaving out Albania and Macedonia.  
The emphasis on domestic republican reforms – so central to republican security theory – 
was still important to the decision-making. Being a MAP participant did not guarantee 
membership, first of all, as the cases of Albania and Macedonia show. A certain level of 
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adequate domestic governance was still required to join NATO. In addition, the inclusion of 
Slovakia in the final seven was only confirmed after a parliamentary election there solidified 
republican norms.199 Finally, the seven states invited to join NATO were still required to 
continue participation in the MAP and to submit timetables for reform that acted as “a 
mechanism for maintaining NATO’s leverage over the invitees for as long as possible.”200 It is 
inaccurate to characterize this second, robust round of enlargement as driven solely by 
geostrategic considerations. Thus, the 2002 enlargement certainly aimed towards the republican 
security objectives of extending the space in Europe in which the U.S. would never have to fight 
a major war, and of installing and protecting new republican governments.  
 That the size of enlargement initiated in Prague, however, was bigger than had been 
expected before September 11 (even after Bush’s Warsaw speech) was born out by 
administration thinking.201 There was undoubtedly a new emphasis on capabilities that had been 
absent during the Clinton decisions on enlargement. As a senior U.S. official told The 
Washington Post, "September 11 changed the way we looked at enlargement," in that U.S. 
policymakers realized they needed “as many allies as we can get" to fight terrorism.202 Through 
their participation in the war in Afghanistan and in other counter-terror measures, the seven new 
members – including the states thought to lag most behind in terms of democratic reforms, 
Bulgaria and Romania – displayed that they were worth integrating into NATO and receiving the 
alliance’s protection.203 There is clear evidence, then, that the material-contextual environment 
                                                 
199
 Ibid. 
200
 Moore (2007), 61. 
201
 Kaiser, “NATO Ready to Admit,” The Washington Post, September 26, 2002. Also, Richard 
Rupp, NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline, (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 
2006), 116-117. 
202
 Quoted in Kaiser, “NATO Ready to Admit,” The Washington Post, September 26, 2002.  
203
 Ibid. Also, see Moore (2007), 85-86. 
 74 
and the new U.S. sense of violence interdependence heavily influenced the 2002 enlargement 
decisions.  
 The broad inclusiveness of this second enlargement round led some to believe that it was 
merely a way for the Bush administration, adamant about forming ad-hoc coalitions, to finally 
relegate NATO to the status of political club, without strong alliance cohesion or major 
capabilities. Bush administration officials deny this accusation.204 While deepest motivations are 
difficult to judge, in terms of initiatives taken up at the Prague summit in November 2002 there 
at least seemed to be a genuine effort to update and modernize NATO into an effective fighting 
force. Though not formally tied to NATO enlargement policy, a bevy of policies and programs 
were launched at the Prague Summit that sought to keep NATO relevant as a military alliance, 
and upgrade its capabilities for fighting terrorism and other threats creating high 
interdependence. These included a NATO Rapid Response Force, a Partnership Action Plan for 
terrorism, and a new WMD initiative.205  
The incentives for republican constraints on foreign governments was also strengthened 
by the introduction of the Individual Partner Action Plan, which was designed to enhance 
cooperation, specifically in the areas of military and democratic practices, between NATO and 
states that either did not want to commence in the MAP program or were not yet ready. This was 
deemed a particularly important outreach to Central Asian and Caucasus states that were more 
strategically vital after September 11th.206 It also represents a continued effort to influence the 
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installation of republican governments around the globe, an objective of republican security 
theory. 
 
Republican Security and the 2002 Enlargement Decision 
The enlargement decisions leading up to the Prague summit were consistent with 
republican security theory. In embracing practically all of what the Clinton administration left in 
their enlargement policy, there is no doubt that the two core republican security objectives of 
NATO enlargement were still prominent for Bush policymakers. NATO membership was 
extended to the seven countries in 2002 with the notion that it would contribute to a unified and 
more stable Europe, in which the United States would never again be forced to partake in major 
conflicts. By applying the MAP requirements and insisting on their continuity even after 
invitations had been issued, the objective of influencing and protecting emerging republican 
regimes throughout the international system also remained a clear priority for NATO 
enlargement policymakers.  
September 11th, however, seemed to heighten the importance given to the last republican 
security objective – mitigating areas of anarchy-interdependence outside of NATO territory. The 
centrality of the material factor of violence interdependence is especially helpful here. As 
Deudney writes, 9/11 renewed debate over the extent to which “deterrence was a way to 
reconcile the anarchic state system with intense violence interdependence.”207 By suddenly 
thrusting terrorism and WMDs from “speculative scenarios into primary security threats,” 9/11 
essentially pushed the Bush administration towards “a far-reaching post deterrence doctrine,” of 
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which preemptive attack and global power projection played central roles.208 In this way, the new 
focus on niche capabilities of aspirant NATO members represented a logical response to the 
intense levels of violence and anarchy-interdependence introduced into American consciousness 
after 9/11. Higher degrees of violence interdependence will spur more policies that seek to 
enlarge the space of republican constraints and mitigate the spaces of anarchy. A more robust 
enlargement – which in essence is more and wider republican cobinding – is not only consistent 
with republican security theory but also expected.  
The new requirements for NATO membership – with a stronger emphasis on military 
capabilities but not abandonment of the republican constraints criterion – represented a shift in 
degree, not content, from the Clinton administration. The fact that U.S. officials felt the 
“operating environment” was far more Western-oriented than it had been in 1997 suggests that 
“republican constraints” need not necessarily have improved from where they were in 1997, just 
maintained.209 And though the criterion of “republican constraints” was still important (as 
evidenced by the Romania and Bulgaria membership decisions coming last), there was a new 
value placed on the “capable military” criterion. The republican security perspective on this 
round of NATO enlargement is summarized in the table below:  
 
Table 5. Republican Security Perspective on 2002 NATO Enlargement 
 
 “Capable” military capacity Lack of “capable” military 
“Enough” republican constraints on 
domestic military and government 
NATO offers membership Indeterminate, but likely membership 
offer 
• eg, Slovenia, Baltics 
“Not enough” republican 
constraints on domestic military and 
government 
Indeterminate, but possible 
membership offer 
• eg, Romania, Bulgaria  
NATO does not offer membership 
• eg, Albania 
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The constructivist perspective would clearly have a more difficult timing grappling with the 
decisions made in 2002. While a constructivist hypothesis on enlargement predicted one more 
NATO member in 1997 because of its tunnel-focus on “shared values,” the perspective misses 
the mark by predicting fewer invitations to NATO in 2002. Romania and Bulgaria in particular, 
with their lackluster political and democratic records, would probably not fit into a constructivist 
prediction for NATO enlargement. The clear new emphasis on the niche capabilities and 
strategic value of aspirant members falls outside the constructivist paradigm of values and norms 
as the sole metric for enlargement decisions. 
 The specific realist argument that NATO enlargement is just another example of states 
acting towards relative power gains – in that the policy represented a power grab by the U.S 
intrusion into Russian spheres of influence – does not seem particularly convincing once again. 
Though here the realist argument holds far more water than in 1997, essentially because this 
round of enlargement included the Baltic states, the history does not bear out the realist analysis 
of security policies being solely for the purpose of relative gains over other states. The laser 
focus on terrorism and WMD after September 11th, the subsequent Russian cooperation, and the 
appraisal of NATO members’ in terms of their domestic character and added value to NATO 
out-of-area operations all do not suggest that U.S. policymakers were most concerned with using 
NATO enlargement as a means to keep down the Russians. While there may be long-term 
advantages should Russia ever turn severely expansionist, this was not the primary concern nor 
central motivation of U.S. policymakers.   
 Finally, the primacy perspective is consistent with the Bush policy on NATO 
enlargement. In the wake of September 11th, there is no doubt that the U.S. was using 
enlargement as a means to project the scope and capacity of American and NATO military 
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power. That said, the cooperative security motivation of NATO enlargement was less present as 
compared to the Clinton administration. It is safe to say, looking at other policies pursued by the 
Bush administration, that policymakers were not embarking on a bold mission to create a global 
network of overlapping international institutions that would eventually serve to deter major 
threats to security and foster widespread international cooperation. While the primacy 
perspective is not useful under Clinton but useful under Bush, the cooperative security 
perspective is useful for Clinton and not particularly for Bush.   
 Republican security theory offers a consistent perspective on NATO enlargement across 
both administrations. Unsurprisingly, perspectives that focus in on particular kinds of U.S. grand 
strategy inevitably shift in their explanatory power as new administrations come into office. This 
is not a flaw with the perspectives, only an inherent limitation. Hence I would argue, through its 
consistency and applicability over time, that republican security theory offers a better 
explanation for the significant continuity in NATO enlargement policy. The republican security 
concepts of anarchy-interdependence, hierarchy-restraint, and cobinding through interstate union 
are all highly visible in arguments from the Clinton and two Bush administrations. NATO 
enlargement throughout that time was consistently geared towards expanding the space in which 
the U.S. would not have to face major conflicts, increasing the number of republican 
governments internationally, and confronting dangerous spaces of weak governance out-of-area.  
 
* * *  
 
It wasn’t until April 2008 that the next round of NATO enlargement was confirmed. This 
round, likely coming at the alliance’s 60th anniversary in April 2009, will only include the two 
long-serving MAP states, Albania and Croatia. In the six years since the 2002 enlargement 
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decision, however, there were a handful of enlargement-related policies worth noting that 
contributed to the republican security objectives of NATO enlargement.  
 The Bush administration continued to set its sights on areas of acute anarchy-
interdependence, specifically the greater Middle East. Using the Prague summit as a jumping off 
point, U.S. policymakers urged a broadening in scope and mission of NATO activities, 
especially in its outreach and activity in the Middle East. 210 U.S. Ambassador to NATO 
Nicholas Burns justified the broader scope with anarchy-interdependence rationales, arguing “in 
an era of globalized threats, no matter where we are in the world, we live downstream, because 
what happens in one region of the world affects the rest of the world.”211 While Iraq and 
Afghanistan focused the outreach, U.S. arguments relied on the violence interdependence felt 
from those regions – in areas of extreme anarchy that allows for terrorist safe havens, and in 
areas of extreme hierarchy that allow for rouge regimes and proliferators. The republican 
security concepts were still present in NATO, even if enlargement was not explicitly on the 
agenda. As Rebecca Moore writes, “NATO’s outreach to the Middle East constitutes a shift, not 
in the nature of NATO’s post-Cold War mission, but rather in the scope of its 
vision…[stemming] ultimately from a recognition that, just as NATO had projected stability to 
its east during the 1990s, it must now seek to project stability well beyond the Euro-Atlantic 
area.”212 
 The U.S. also continued to be the main advocate for further NATO enlargement within 
the alliance. The strategic value of Central Asia and the Caucasus in the wake of September 11th 
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supplied the impetus for renewed NATO outreach to these areas.213 President Bush made the 
U.S. position on further enlargement clear in April 2008, when he strongly pushed for invitations 
to Georgia and the Ukraine. Though NATO promised eventual membership to these countries, 
the allies could not come to an agreement on a timetable or a MAP for either country, with 
particular resistance coming from Germany due to worries over Russian relations.214 The result 
was a compromise holding off any concrete plans, but pledging a return to the issue in December 
2008. 
 After the Russian conflict in Georgia in August 2008 and the deep divisions in Ukrainian 
government, it seemed even less likely that MAPs for these two countries would be forthcoming. 
However, in one last-ditch attempt, the Bush administration strongly pushed for NATO offers to 
both of these countries starting in November 2008 and advocated bypassing the MAP process all 
together.215 With only a month remaining in the Bush administration, Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice reached a compromise with NATO allies, whereby the U.S. would support 
renewed relations with the Russians in exchange for an accelerated process for Georgia and the 
Ukraine. The NATO relations with these countries would continue in the NATO commissions 
established in the nineties, rather than actual MAPs. The final decisions on whether and how 
Georgia and Ukraine would eventually join NATO were left to the incoming Obama 
administration.216  
 
III. Conclusion 
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This study does not attempt to evaluate the efficacy of U.S. policy on NATO 
enlargement. I have sought only to highlight the articulated motives of U.S. policymakers, as 
they look the lead on enlargement.  
I argued that the U.S. policy on NATO enlargement since the end of the Cold War has 
been most influenced by republican security theory. To make my argument, I tested perspectives 
in international relations (particularly constructivism), and perspectives on U.S. strategy  
(cooperative security and primacy), against the history of NATO enlargement and records and 
statements of U.S. policymakers. I found that no perspective does as good a job as republican 
security theory in explaining the objectives and decisions of U.S. policymakers as they sought to 
enlarge NATO.  
I showed how republican security theoretical concepts – anarchy-interdependence, 
hierarchy-restraint, and cobinding through interstate union – all appeared in the statements and 
arguments made by administration officials pushing for NATO enlargement. I also showed how 
the policies of NATO enlargement pursued the three objectives of the republican security agenda 
of American internationalism: expand the space in which the U.S. no longer faces the potential 
of major, violent conflicts; strengthen the incentives for and protect the emergence of new 
republican states in the international system; and contain the most instable and insecure areas of 
weak governance outside of NATO territory. The Clinton and second Bush administrations in 
particular, by utilizing the carrot of NATO membership to foster republican reforms and offering 
NATO membership to those states that were democratically advanced and military capable, 
sought to fulfill these republican security objectives.  
As President Obama takes office, the republican security logic of NATO enlargement 
still holds. From a republican security perspective, extreme levels of violence interdependence 
 82 
are here to stay; they are due to material facts on the ground. The need to govern more spaces of 
anarchy through republican unions will continue to make NATO enlargement, whether this year 
or in five years, a necessary priority. Here’s predicting that, consistent with republican security 
theory, President Obama oversees the accession of additional states into NATO during his 
presidency. 
By viewing NATO enlargement as a republican security initiative, it becomes possible to 
see it, in essence, as a security practice the United States has been implementing since it’s 
founding. Deudney’s historical reconstruction of republican security theory suggests that the 
roots go even further into the past than that. Through all of the political and ulterior motivations 
thrown around in the NATO enlargement debate, nothing can shroud the fact that the United 
States is now bound to protect the security of twenty-five other republics. NATO enlargement is 
a continuation of the American founding, a union between small republics for the sake of 
security, and a continuation of the American tradition of protecting republican governments 
around the globe. NATO enlargement – whatever one’s opinion of its strategic value or its 
efficacy – shows the United States doing what it has always done. 
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